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REFLECTIONS ON THE PROPOSED OHIO LAW OF HOMICIDE
All men agree that in general it is desirable to prevent homicide and
bodily injury. The scope of reasonable controversy is therefore lim-
ited to the way in which the criminal law can and should operate to
this end.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the hierarchy of human values that underly the formation of a ra-
tional penal law, the sanctity of human life and the prevention of bodily
injuries should rank as the apex of the system. Certainly, it could not be
denied that foremost in the thoughts of men is the continuance of existence
and bodily security. Death and physical injury are surely the most personal
and aggravating forms of harm that a criminal code could proscribe. If
the desire to structure conduct is at the heart of a code of criminal law,
penalties should be directed at harmful conduct that causes loss of life or
bodily injury. A pure ethical position, therefore, would assert that it is de-
sirable to preserve all human life and that all conduct that causes homi-
cides and bodily injuries should be punished. However, historically and
pragmatically Anglo-American jurisprudence has not viewed all homicides
and bodily injuries to require the imposition of criminal sanctions.- Thus,
homicides and bodily injuries have been classified as noncriminal because
they were thought to be either desirable (war and capital punishment),
justifiable (self-defense), or excusable (accidental). The gradations of
homicides and physical injuries in modern criminal codes have involved the
attempt to discover adequate criteria (1) to distinguish criminal conduct
from conduct that is not culpable or where a civil remedy is sufficient, and
(2) to distinguish serious criminal conduct that merits the ultimate sanc-
tion from criminal behavior that may be disciplined with lesser forms of
punishment.3
Within this narrowed scope of inquiry, the purpose of the law of homi-
cide should be the prevention of proscribable harm by the punishment of
individuals in accordance with their actions and state of mind.4 The corn-
I Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701,
702 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler and Michael].
21d. at 726-52. Wechsler and Michael's thesis recognizes that although it is generally
desirable to preserve all human life, if the criminal law were to discourage all conduct that
involved a homicidal risk, highly desirable behavior would be dihcouraged to the detriment
of society. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) [herein.
after cited M.P.C. (Tent. Draft No. 9)]; Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code,
65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1114-15 (1952); Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United
States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1432 (1968),
3 Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 726-33; Wechsler, Codification of Criminal
Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L REV. 1425, 1432, 1435
(1968).
4 In a criminal code's classification system, differences betwcen non-culpable and cul-
pable conduct and between various ranges of culpable conduct ,,hould be made with ref-
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mon goals of punishment-deterrence (specific and general), incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation--should facilitate this purpose of prevention. Pun-
ishment, therefore, should be confined to conduct that can usefully be made
a target of preventive effort.' Proper targets of preventive action include
those individuals who may be deterred and those individuals who may be
so dangerous to society that they require incapacitation. Thus, the degree
of criminal sanction that should be utilized in the punishment of any
homicidal offense should be gauged in relationship to the amount of pun-
ishment that is necessary to effect the function of general and specific
deterrence or incapacitation."
However, more than any other area of the criminal law, sanctions for
criminal homicide are based upon a retributive or revenge theory.T Al-
though the efficacy of retribution as a goal of the criminal law has been
rejected by many modern commentators,8 the retributive model of pun-
ishment has been thought to have some lingering value in the homicide area
where the outrage of society is reflected in the expiation by punishment?
But a pure retributive theory for the imposition of criminal sanctions (that
is, punishment solely because of a moral wrong) undercuts the other goals
erence to the state of mind and behavior of individuals with the concommitant results of
their conduct defining the possibilities of criminal sanctions. But see Hadden, Offenses of
Violence: The Law and Facts, 1968 CLM. L REV. 521. Professor Hadden's thesis attempts
to establish from existing social and factual evidence that traditional mns rea categories
often bear very little relation to the realities that courts must deal with and to make any
real progress in codification less attention should be given to the mental element and more
to the total situation of the offense. Such a theory is reflected in the manslaughter section
of the Proposed Code. See Final Report of the Technical Committee to Study Ohio Crim-
inal Laws and Procedures, PRoPosED OHIo CRImuNAL CODE § 2903.03(a) (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Ptop. Omo CmL CODE]. The text of the proposed legislation is incorporated
in HousE BILL NUmBER 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly (1971) [hereinafter cited as
H.B. 511].
5 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 1432. "If fault is to be found with human conduct becmuse
it is offensive in its nature, potentialities or consequences, it surely is essential that the ac-
tor knew or should have known the facts that give it this offensive character." Id. at 1435.
See Danforth, Model Penal Code and Degrees of Criminal Homicide, 11 AM U.L. REV.
147, 168 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Danforth]. (If the purpose of law is to apply by sanc-
tion a countermotive to crime, it must assume a rational mind capable of seeing and evalu-
ating the warning.) See also Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 736-52.
6 For a study of the efficacy of deterrence that points to the problems of the length of
the sanction and the certainty of its imposition, sce F. ZIMING, PERSPECIVES ON DETE-
REN E 32, 83-92 (1971). Besides its questionable effectiveness, the goal of rehabilitatioa
is a neutral concept that is applicable and functional regardless of the length of the im-
posed sentence.
7 Danforth, supra note 5, at 167.
8 See Danforth, supra note 5; Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 730 n.126 . Com-
pare Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Pcnal Code, 65 HARV. L REV. 1097, 1115 (1952)
(gradations within a criminal code may even reflect the punitive response that public opinion
demands), with Wechsler, supra note 3, at 1432 (penal law should not be used to express the
pious sentiment of the community).
9 In utilitarian terms the retributive effect of the criminal sanction is needed because
in its absence the law would fall into disrepute and private retribution would take the
place of public sanctions. See E. DUtKIEM, THE DVSION OF LABOR AND SOCET 102-09
(Simpson trans. 1933) (criminal law not closely akin to the morals of society will be repudi-
ated).
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of the criminal law and is insufficient by itself to support a rational system
of penal sanctions because application of this theory does not help to pro-
tect society but merely reacts to social harm. In a system that stresses the
prevention of harm, any incremental amount of punishment more than that
required for effective deterrence would seem to represent a retributive sanc-
tion. Indeed, any sentence for a homicidal crime that is imposed for a
length of time beyond that which is needed for deterrence seems to be an
illegitimate use of punishment because the accretion does not add to the se-
curity of human life. Thus, the inclusion of retributive manifestations
within a rational penal law revision does not aid in fulfilling the purpose
of the law of homicide and actually may detract from other theories of
punishment that do.
In this comment an attempt will be made to uncover the rationale guid-
ing the formulation of the law of homicide in the Proposed Ohio Criminal
Code'0 and to compare that formulation and rationale with trends in modern
penal code revisions as well as with the structure of the present Ohio law.
Because much of the work of distinguishing between criminal conduct and
non-criminal conduct has been done in the proposed sections on culpable
mental states'" and defenses,' 2 the scope of this comment will be limited to a
discussion of the effects of the Proposed Code on the present Ohio law and
of possible alternative formulations that would serve the goals of the crimi-
nal law in a more efficient and rational way.13 Before the initiation of dis-
cussion on the proposed law of homicide, however, one basic criticism that
applies throughout the analysis of the homicide provisions should be empha-
sized. Generally, the Proposed Code's sanctions in the homicide area repre-
10 Final Report of the Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures, PRoposED OHIo CaMINAL CODE (1971). [hereinafter citod as PROP. OHIO CRIM.
CODE]. The text of the proposed legislation is incorporated in HOUSE BILL NUMBER 511,
109th General assembly (1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 511].
"l PROP. OHIo CRuM. CODE § 2901.22.
12 PROP. OIO CraM. CODE §§ 2901.31-38. The sections on culpable mental states and
defenses represent a codification and revision of the present Ohio statutory and common law.
Full discussions of these sections are the subjects of other comments in this symposium.
For purposes of analyzing the proposed Ohio law on homicide and bodily injury, refer-
ences will be made to the various rens rea requirements only to define the gradations of the
offenses and to focus on aberrational consequences. In addition, it is significant to note as this
point that some defenses (e.g., duress) are specifically inapplicable to homicidal offenses.
13 Discussions of abortion and suicide will not be included in this comment. Early in
its deliberation the Technical Committee that drafted the Proposed Code decided that abor-
tion (PROP. OHo Cim. CODE § 2919.11) should be considered s.!parately and that suicide
should not be included in the context of criminal conduct. See 'he Technical Committee
to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No. 23-2 (June 19, 1967).
Since suicide is not an offense, complicity in a suicide is likewise non-criminal. See
PROP. OHIO CrIM. CODE § 2923.03. The drafters of the Proposed Code felt that no public
interest was served by criminalizing complicity to suicide even though there was common
law support in Ohio for the proposition. See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (Proposed Offtcial Draft 1o62) [hereinafter cited as
M.P.C. (P.O.D.)I; M.P.C. § 201.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30,
.35 (McKinney 1967). See generally G. WILLIAMS, THE SANcrITy OF LIFE AND THE CRIM-
NAL LAw (1957).
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sent an enlargement of the punishment provided for basically similar
offenses contained in the present Ohio law. This increase can be explained
by either a retributive theory or a theory of marginal general deterrence.
The relationship between retributive sanctions and the purpose of the law of
homicide has already been explored, and the retributive theory has been
rejected as inconsistent with that purpose. Although it is logical to as-
sume that a greater sanction will have a greater impact on deterrence,
available data in the area has suggested that increased penalties have little
impact as an extra deterrent, even though legislators have placed great faith
in such increases.. 4 Whether or not the increased sanction for the specific
conduct is accomplished by lowering the mens rea requirement for a greater
offense or by just raising the sanction imposed for the conduct under the
present law is a secondary problem to the lack of any theoretical basis for
this basic increase in the homicide sanctions.
II. CAPrrAL MURDER AND MURDE-R'
A. The Premeditation-Deliberation Formula
Without any consideration of the mental element, criminal homicide is
the killing of another that is not excused or justified.' 6 The English com-
mon law of criminal homicide distinguished between murder and man-
slaughter on the basis of malice aforethought-express if the killing was
accompanied by an intent to kill or to do grevious bodily harm or implied if
the nature of the killing evidenced a depraved indifference to life or if it
accompanied the commission of a felony.'7 This gradation of criminal
homicides in England grew out of the ancient concept of benefit of clergy
and was designed to mitigate the harshness of capital punishment, The
distinguishing standard, malice aforethought, by definition included the
idea that the killing was voluntary and without adequate provocation.
The English classification system was carried to the United States
where it was significantly modified. The American permutation of the
common law definition divided murder into two degrees in an attempt to
limit the use of the death penalty, which was reserved for murder in the first
degree, and distinguished between the two degrees on the basis of premedi-
tation and deliberation.' 9 In addition first degree murder included a modi-
14 F. ZIMNG, PERsPEcnlvEs oN DETERENcH 89 (1971).
15 For a legislative history of the proposed sections on murder and capital murder, see
APPENDIx I, in!ra.
16Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.LF. 565
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Gegan).
17 See Byrn, Homicide Under the Proposed New York Penal Law, 33 FORD L REV.
173, 175 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Byrn); Wechsler and Michael, rvpra note 1, at 702-03;
Wechsler, supra note 3, at 1445.
18 Danforth, supra note 5, at 148 n.4, 149.
19 See Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 703-04; Wechsler, rupra note 3, at 1445.
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fled version of the common law idea of the felony-murder rule.20 But the
most important development in the law of murder in this country was the
creation of the premeditation-deliberation formula.
Premeditation and deliberation in the law of murder was originally
thought to require that the homicidal scheme was conceived and planned
well in advance of the actual killing.2' However, judicial development of
the premeditation-deliberation formula perverted the normal interpretation
of the words until the formula was satisfied by a very short duration (that is,
enough time for reflection).- In effect the premeditation-deliberation for-
mula was eliminated from the definition of first degree murder and that
left only the requirement of a specific intent to kill and a privilege offered
the jury to bestow mercy in particular cases.23  Additionally, in some states
the delineations between murder and manslaughter by way of the provoca-
tion formula and between the two degrees of murder by way of premedita-
tion and deliberation have become mixed and confused.24 This confusion
has resulted in situations in which a homicide that was provoked but not
sufficiently to classify it as manslaughter automatically became murder in
the first degree because the seconds between the provocative conduct and the
fatal act were thought to be enough to satisfy the requirements of premedi-
tation and deliberation.25  This conclusion seems to be antithetical to the
original purpose of distinguishing between the two degrees of murder.
Ohio's present law on murder has followed the general American trend
of dividing murder into two degrees. First degree murder thus contem-
plates a purposeful killing with "deliberate and premeditated malice" and a
modified form of the felony-murder rule.20 Consequently, second degree
The first state statute using two degrees of murder differentiated by the prenueditatlon-
deliberation formula was passed in Pennsylvania in 1794. This statute has been used as
a model by many state penal codes in operation today. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.01 (Page 1954). For an excellent study of the Pennsylvania Statute, see Keedy,
History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1949).
20 For a discussion of the felony-murder rule, see subpart 3, infra.
21 Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 707; Gegan, supra note 16, at 567. See
M.P.C. § 201.6 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9).
2 2 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Drum 58 Pa. 9 (1868); Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So. 2d
684 (Fla. 1959). Since there is no intent unless there is a choice, sudden impulse became
the dividing line. Gegan, supra note 16, at 567-68.
23 What we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree
when the suddeness of intent, the vehemence of the passion, seem to call irresist-
ably for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving them this dispens-
ing power, but it should be given to them directly and not in a mystifying cloud of
words. The present distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first
time can fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it.
B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATuP 100 (1931).
24 See Byrn, supra note 17, at 177.
2 5 E.g., Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1959).
2  OIO PEV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954). Malice is generally inferred if a put-
pose to kill is established. See State v. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 270, 30 N.E. 437 (1892); Weaver
v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584 (1874). See also 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUcrLONS-CRIMXInAL § 409.25
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 4 O.J.I.-CRmINAL1.
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murder includes all other homicides that are perpetrated "purposely and
maliciously."' In addition, Ohio has construed its premeditation-delibera-
tion formula to require no substantial planning in accordance with the gen-
eral trend of the law in this country.28
Although the proposed draft of the murder sections has discarded the
nomenclature of the traditional division of murder into degrees, the pro-
posed offenses of capital murder and murder have retained, with some modi-
fication, the essential characteristics of the present statutes. 9 Significantly,
the Proposed Code distinguishes between capital murder and murder not
only on the basis of some idea of premeditation but also on the basis of two
different mental states. The proposed basic capital murder section (absent
the felony-murder rule) retains the requirement of a purpose to kill; how-
ever, the proposal on murder requires only a "knowing" homicide. If the
definitions of "purposely" and "knowingly" were similar to the ideas con-
tained in the Model Penal Code, this change would have a small effect.P
Thus, homicides not perpetrated with prior calculation and design but com-
mitted "purposely" would fall within the bounds of the proposed murder
statute because under the Proposed Code purposeful conduct is also done
"knowingly."'" This is the same result that would occur under the present.
law. On the other hand, a "knowing" homicide that is now classified as man-
slaughter would be accelerated in seriousness to murder. For example, if
X is involved in an altercation with Y whom he knows to have a fragile
skull and in the heat of the fight (without premeditation) throws a rock at
Y which strikes his skull and kills him, under the present Ohio law X would
be guilty of either murder in the second degree or manslaughter depending
upon whether or not the jury believed that X intended death to result.
Since the factual basis of X's purpose to kill is equivocal, the jury would
have to find X guilty of manslaughter at the most. But if the proposed mur-
der mens tea of "knowingly" is defined like the Model Penal Code (aware-
ness of conduct that is practically certain to cause the proscribed result) Xs;
2 7 Omo REV. CODE ANN-*. § 2901.05 (Page 1954). All homicides that are not committed
with a purpose to kill (excluding vehicular homicides) are either manslaughter or non-
criminal.
2 8 State v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio 43 (1843); State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St 156, 198 N.2d
439 (1964); State v. Schaffer, 113 Ohio App. 125, 177 N.E.2d 534 (1960) (spur of the mo-
ment rule). But see State v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77, appeal dimissed, 158
Ohio St. 248, 108 N.E.2d 282 (1952); Tolliver v. State, 9 Ohio L Abs. 488 (Cr. App. 1930)
(error to instruct that premeditation can come into existence in a moment). Contra, Bul-
lock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (to speak of premeditation on the spur
of the moment is a contradiction in terms).
2 9 PRop. OHIO CRM. CODE §2903.01 (A) (capital murder):
No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death
of another.
PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.02 (A) (murder):
No person shall knowingly cause the death of another.
SO See M.P.C. § 2.02(2)(a)-(b) (P.O.D.).
3 1 See PROP. OHO CR3m. CODE § 2901.22(E).
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conduct under the Proposed Code would probably be classified as murder
because although the facts are equivocal as to X's specific intent, they firmly
support X's awareness of the result of his conduct. Therefore, even if the
jury were not foreclosed from finding manslaughter in X's situation, it
would conclude on the facts with greater certainty that X "knowingly" killed
even though it could not find a purpose to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since the basic capital murder provision in the Proposed Code still requires
an element of premeditation, this effect would not expand the scope of capi-
tal punishment but would increase the penalty for a "knowing" homicide
under the Proposed Code from a maximum sentence of four to ten years im-
prisonment 2 to a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment. 3
However, the draft of the proposed sections on culpable mental states
presents a somewhat confusing array of definitions. Although the defini-
tion of "purposely" in the Proposed Code is almost identical to the Model
Penal Code formulation, 4 the Proposed Code's definition of "knowingly"
substantially deviates from the Model Penal Code and creates a material
expansion of the scope of the proposed murder statute."' Whereas the
Model Penal Code definition of "knowingly" involves an actor's awareness
that his conduct is practically certain to cause a proscribable result, the Ohio
proposal on "knowingly" focuses on the actor's awareness that his conduct
is likely to cause a result. This difference in language seems to indicate that
"knowingly" under the Ohio proposal requires a less culpable mental state
than the Model Penal Code formulation. The effect of the distinction be-
tween likely and practically certain will be to include many homicides in
the proposed murder provision that would otherwise be considered man-
slaughter. For example, if Q engages in an alteraction with Z which
results in Z's death because Q struck Z with his fist which caused Z to strike
his head upon the ground, under a standard of "knowingly" that requires
practical certainty Q would probably be found guilty of manslaughter or
some lesser homicide because the factual basis of Q's mental state does not
rise to the level to indicate that Q was practically certain when he landed his
blow that he would cause a homicidal result. However, since the require-
ment of likely expands the range of factual situations encompassed by the
proposed murder provision, a jury would probably find 0 guilty of a "know-
ing" murder because it could conclude on the facts that 0 was consciously
aware that death was likely to result from his conduct. From a practical
standpoint in the majority of murder cases, the jury will no longer be given
32 Pop. OHno CRIM. CODE § 2929.04(B) (3).
33 PRoP. OF1O CRIM. CODE § 2929.01(B).
34 Compare PROp. OHIO CRrM. CODE § 2901.22(A), with M.P.C. § 2.02 (2)(a)(P.O.D.).
3 5 Compare PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(B), with M.P.C. § 2.02(2)(b)(P.OD.).
For an exposition of the present Ohio law on guilty knowledge, see 4 0.J..-CIUMINAL §
409.09.
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the choice of manslaughter in a case warranting possibly no greater sanc-
"tion.
Besides the alterations in the mens rea element by the Proposed Code, the
most significant change in differentiating between murder and capital mur-
der is the modification of the premeditation-deliberation formula. At the
outset of their considerations, the drafters of the proposal on homicide real-
ized that the Ohio case law had emasculated the distinction between first
and second degree murder. Thus, their intention was to express disap-
proval of the Ohio case law by changing the wording of "deliberate and
premeditated malice" to something like "substantial prior premeditation."-",
The present proposed language of "prior calculation and design" was inten-
ded to indicate that momentary deliberation may not be sufficient to consti-
tute a studied scheme to kill and that capital murder is appropriate only if
the means as well as the scheme of death is planned with studied care.'
In evaluating the proposed Ohio premediation-deliberation formula,
critical analysis must be directed toward the vagaries of the language itself.
There is no great body of case law in this country defining "prior calculation
and design." Although the drafters of the proposal purport to eliminate
present Ohio case law in the area, they do not suggest what substantive inter-
pretation will take its place. Courts grappling with the problem will inquire
into the origins of the premeditation-deliberation formula as a reference
point. However, it is obvious that the proposed words do not exactly have
the same meaning as the early definitions of premeditation and deliberation.
Thus, a possible jury instruction that could give substance to the barebones
of "prior calculation and design" would be:
To find that the defendant has killed with prior calculation and design,
you [the jury] must find from all the facts and drcumstances of the case
that the defendant before causing the death of the victim estimated the
probable consequences of his contemplated acts, thought about the end that
he was seeking, and considered the means to achieve those ends. The time
elapsed between the formulation of the design of death and the carrying
out of that design must be long enough to give the defendant an oppor-
tunity to reflect on the consequences of his actions and plan the means to
achieve those actions. A sudden impulse to kill is not sufficient to allow
the substantial reflection that the law requires as
In addition to the language problem of the proposed formulation,
though, is the question of the viability of the premeditation-deliberation
36 The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No.
23-1 (May 2, 1967). The language "substantial prior deliberation" was alo tried before
the Committee settled upon the present language. The Technical Committee to Study Ohio
Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No. 23-3-B (April 21, 1970).
37PRop. OHno Cim. CODE § 2901.01, Committee Comments at 71. The length of time
that an offender takes to ponder the crime itself is still not a critical factor.
38 See Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 734 n.139. For the present Ohio jury
charge on deliberate and premeditated malice, see 4 O.J.I.-CI UNAL § 457.01(c).
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formula as sufficient criteria to distinguish murder from capital murder.
Of course, the problem would become almost academic if capital punish-
ment were abolished or limited within a sentencing statute for murder and
not within the substantive definition of the offense itself.3" Without capital
punishment to motivate "mitigating" distinctions within the substantive law,
a unitary concept of murder could be adopted. If capital punishment is to
be retained, though, the premeditation-deliberation formula is an inadequate
criterion to determine the imposition of the death penalty. The formula has
been extensively criticized because it fails to properly separate murders in
accordance with the recognized goals of the criminal law. 0 In juxtaposition
to such criticism is the idea that offenders who reflect upon their criminal
conduct are more readily deterred and less dangerous than actors who kill
spontaneously. However, since most murders are crimes of passion or ex-
treme depravity, the offenders who may be the most readily deterred may not
be the most dangerous criminals in society. Thus, if the purpose of the law
of homicide is to prevent harm to human life, the truly dangerous offender
must also be criminalized and incapacitated.
A possible alternative to proposed sections on murder and capital murder
could be developed from a modified form of the suggested statutes in the
Model Penal Code4' or the Proposed Federal Criminal Code.4 2 This pro-
posal would include a category of murder that proscribed conduct manifest-
ing an extreme indifference to the value of life.4 3  Nevertheless, a similar
formulation was criticized by the Technical Committee because (1) it de-
creased the flexibility of the prosecution; (2) it would expand the scope of
the death penalty; and (3) it would be contrary to the traditional Ohio law
on murder which requires a specific intent to kill.4 4  However, with a uni-
9 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1967); M.P.C. § 210.2 (P.O.D.). The
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report: A PROPOSED
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE--TITLE 18 at § 1601 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PROP.
FED. CRIM. CODE].
40 "As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at
least as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by sudden
as by premeditated murders:'
3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (1883).
See M.P.C. § 201.6, Comment at 68-71 (Tent. Draft No. 9); PROP. FED. CRIM. CODE § 1601,
Comments; The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 97 (1967) [hereinafter sited as TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS]; Danforth, supra note 5, at 151; Gegan, supra note 16, at 567; Wechsler, supra
note 3, at 1446.
41M.P.C. § 210.1-.2(P.O.D.). The history of the Proposed Code reveals that a scheme
like the Model Penal Code's homicide provisions was submitted to the Technical Committee
and was rejected. See the Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures,
Draft No. 23 (Apr. 17, 1967).
4 2 PROP. FED. CRnM. CODE § 1601.
43The English common law contained a similar murder formulation. See Wtechsler
and Michael, supra note 1, at 703.
44 See The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Criminal Proce.
dures, Draft No. 23 (Apr. 17, 1967). Other criticisms of the Model Penal Code murder
proposals have been that it is too vague; that it adds an additional mens tca category; and
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tary murder concept, prosecutorial flexibility actually would be enhanced by
the additional category. Furthermore, the problem of the death penalty
would disappear if it were abolished or if the criteria for the imposition of
capital punishment were removed from the substantive sections and placed
within sensible and adequate sentencing provisions. Since a specific intent
to kill is no longer required in all capital murder cases,45 the consistency of
the present law does not seem to mandate a requirement of a purpose to kill
in fature murder formulations. Therefore, the reluctance to thoroughly re-
vise the Ohio law of murder would seem to be a concession to history and
tradition and not a defensible theoretical position.
The present proposal on the premeditation-deliberation distinction be-
tween capital murder and murder takes Ohio law back approximately to the
original meaning that was intended by the formula. However, it does not
take into account the recent critical developments in the area. Measuring
the proposal against the purported goals of the criminal law, the proposal
still places too much emphasis on the retributive aspect of sanctions without
furthering the purpose of preventing undesirable harm.
B. Special Provisions on Capital Mfrurder.
Within the present Ohio law on capital murder certain provisions on
special homicides which do not require premeditation and which are not
part of the felony-murder rule are included. During the history of the
Ohio Revised Code, certain special interest groups and other external
motivations have influenced the General Assembly to enact murder statutes
with specific references to particular conduct. The effect of these statutes is
to accelerate a homicide to capital status that might otherwise be non-capital
because it was not perpetrated with premeditation and deliberation or in
connection with a felony. For example, under the present law capital mur-
der (i.e., murder that requires the imposition of capital punishment unless
mercy is recommended) includes the killing of a guard by a convict,40 the
killing of a law enforcement officer in the discharge of his duties,47 and the
killing of another which is caused by the malicious obstruction of a rail-
road.48 With one exception, all of these special capital murder provisions
that the idea of reckless indifference is covered by the Ohio definition of "knowingly."
The first two objections do not seem to be well-founded because there is prefent y a de-
veloped body of case law on the interpretation of mcns rca categories, like the Model Penal Cele,
in Illinois and New York. Furthermore, the proposed Ohio definition of "knowingly" is a
confusing permutation of the Model Penal Code definition and appears to cover the Molel Penal
Codes concept of recklessly as well knowingly. ScO PROP. OHIO CrML CODE § 2901.22 (B).
4 See PRoP. Omo Ca lM CODE § 2901.01(C) (felony-murder rule).
4 6 Omfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.03 (Page 1954). It is somewhat unclear whether this
offense requires a specific intent to kill. Sce Baus v. Alvis, 74 Ohio L Abs. 195, 140 N.E.2d
93 (C.P. 1956).
47 Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.04 (Page 1954).
4S O8mo RE V. CODE ANN. § 2901.02 (Page 1954). In addition Ohio's "Little Lindberg
Law" requires a death sentence if an abducted person dies due to injury, threat, exposure,
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are eliminated by the Proposed Code and are replaced with the more uniform
definitions of the proposed murder and capital murder provisions. 40
The single exception in the original proposal to the uniformity of the
capital murder definition referred to a death which was committed purposely
and by means of a concealed weapon or dangerous ordnance.") This provi-
sion was rationalized by the Technical Committee on the ground that some
individuals psychologically were "conditioned to kill" and in a practical
sense murdered their victims with prior calculation and design.51 However,
since the problem was serious and it would be difficult to prove the advance
planning necessary for capital murder, special treatment was thought to be
warranted. Realistically, the original provision made little sense. Besides
having a doubtful psychological foundation, the proposed version's accel-
eration of a spontaneous homicide to capital murder lacked rationality.,
Thus, the imposition of the death penalty seemed to turn solely on the factor
of concealment. If the offender had the weapon operly in his possession, the
resulting purposeful homicide without prior calculation and design would be
murder. The Technical Committee, therefore, seemcd to create a conclusive
presumption of prior calculation and design from the fact of concealment.
Furthermore, the provision was an open admission that the premeditation-
deliberation formula failed to discriminate adequately between the two
grades of murder.0 Whatever deterrence value the proposed subsection
had seemed to be directed more toward the charge of carrying a concealed
weapon than the homicide. For these reasons and others, it was wise for
the legislature to lay the proposal to rest.
However, the amended subsection proscribing the purposeful killing of
another knowing him to be a law enforcement officer in the performance of
his duties represents a return to a capital murder provision for a special inter-
est group.5 3 A similar subsection was considered by the Technical Commit-
or neglect. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.28 (Page 1954). For Ohio homicide provi-
sions requiring a mandatory death sentence, see OHIO RiV. CODE ANN. § 2901.09 (Page
1954) (willfully and maliciously killing the president, vice-president, or other person in
the line of succession); OrnO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.10 (Page 1954) (willful and malicious
killing of the governor or lieutenant governor).
49 Many of the factual situations contained in the present ,pecial murder statutes have
been included as criteria favoring the imposition of the death p:enalty in the amended pro.
posal on capital sentencing. See PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2929.03(B) (as amended In
SuBsTrruTE HOUsE BILL NUmBER 511 [hereinafter cited as SUe. H.B. 511]). Outside the
proposed law on homicide, the death penalty is retained for the amended version or the
proposed kidnapping for hire offense. PROP. OHIO CRIMI. CODE § 2905.01(A)(1) (as amended
in SUB. H.B. 511).
60 PROP. OHIO CRlm. CODE § 2903.01(B):
No person shall purposely cause the death of another by means of a firearm or
dangerous ordnance carried in violation of Section 2923.12 of the Revised Code.
51 PROP. OHIO Caim. CODE § 2903.01, Committee Comments at 71.
52 The original proposal suggested standards similar to the ones contained in the Model
Penal Code formulation of a homicide "evidencing extreme indifference to the value of hu.
man life" which was rejected by the Technical Committee. See M.P.C. § 210.2(1)(b) (P.O.D.).
r3 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.01(B) (as amended in SUE,. H.B. 511):
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tee and was rejected because the Committee believed that law enforcement
officers were adequately protected by the capital murder provision and the
proposed criteria for the imposition of capital punishment." Of course, the
basic effect of the amended proposal is to accelerate a homicide that would
otherwise be murder to capital murder without the requirement of prior
calculation and design. Since the amended subsection has retributive over-
tones and does not significantly add to the deterrence of murders of law en-
forcement officers, which are usually well-planned, it would be better to
delete the amended proposal from the enacted statute.
C. The Felony-Alurder Rule
The felony-murder rule originated at a time in the history of the English
common law when capital punishment was the penalty for all felonies.
Therefore, it made little difference whether the offender was executed for
the homicide or the underlying felony." However, as the severity of sen-
tences for felonies was reduced, the felony-murder rule endured and be-
came a fictional concept that transferred the mental element of the under-
lying felony to the mens rea requirement of murder."" Thus, capital
punishment for homicide was inflicted without regard to the actor's mental
state concerning the homicide. Intentional, reckless, and accidental homi-
cides during a felony were swept up in the scope of the rule.
Several mutations of the common law rule were developed in this coun-
try as well as England to mitigate its harsh operation and were utilized in
the rule's modern formulations. These variations either listed specific fel-
onies (usually violent) that triggered the operation of the rule*T or just
referred to those felonies that by their nature involved a risk of death. 5
No person shall purposely cause the death of another whom he knows is a law en-
forcement officer performing his duties in protecting persons or property, prevent-
ing or detecting crime, apprehending or detaining offenders, or otherwise enforc-
ing the law.
54 PRoP. Orno CRns CoDE § 2903.01, Committee Comments at 71-72.
55 R. PERKNs, CstNfrNAL LAw 44 (1969). Blackstone was one of the first English judi-
cial scholars to verbalize the rule: "[1]f one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly
kills a man, this is also murder." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CO.MENTARIES 200 (1818). For a
history of the rule, see The Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, U.K.
CMD. No. 8932, at 77-90, Appendix 7(b)(1953); Prevezer, Tho English Homicide Act: A
New Attempt to Revise the Law of Mfurdcr, 57 COLUN. L REV. 624, 634 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Prevezer).
5 6 Gegan, supra note 16, at 586. This requirement of malhum prohibitum was the es.
sence of the common law felony murder rule. See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility For
the LethalActs of Others, 105 U. PA. L REV. 50,59 (1956).
57 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. § 4701 (Purdon 1963).
58See People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924); State v. Diebold, 152
Wash. 68, 277 P. 394 (1929). In England, Stephen, J. in Regina v. Seme, 16 Cox Crim.
Cas. 311 (1887), attempted to abrogate the rule by judicial fiat. In Seme the court fouaiz-
on the defendant's conduct rather than the inherent nature of the felony. The case narrowly,
limited the scope of the rule and approached the modem "recdless depravity" definition
of murder. Although the case was frequently distinguished after Stephen's time, the felony-
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Other recent formulations of the felony-murder rule have attempted to al-
leviate its harshness by creating a rebuttable presumption of "reckless
indifference" if the homicide were committed during the perpetration of
specified felonies59 or by designing a limited affirmative defense for a par-
ticipant in the underlying felony who did not cause the death.10 Signifi-
candy, these changes have had varying effects upon the application of
capital punishment due to the differences in the definitions of capital mur-
der in the several jurisdictions."'
The development of the felony-murder doctrine in. Ohio has been unique.
Although the statute typically listed specific felonies that triggered the
operation of the rule, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Robbins v. State 2 in-
terpreted the language to require a purposeful homicide. Thus, to com-
plete the offense of felony-murder in Ohio, a defendant is required to com-
mit the homicide with a specific intent to kill instead of having the mens rca
requirement of first degree murder supplied by the mental element of the
underlying felony.6 3  The underlying felony then functions only to supply
the requisite premeditated and deliberate malice for first degree murder.01
Therefore, since the present Ohio second degree murder statute requires a
purposeful killing,65 a homicide committed during the perpetration of one
of the listed felonies can only be first degree murder or manslaughter.
This narrow statutory interpretation has existed for over one hundred years
murder rule (constructive murder) in England was eventually abolished. The English Homl.
ide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c.11, § 1.
59 M.P.C. § 210.2(1)(b) (P.O.D.). In Wisconsin, a jurisdiction which has abolished cap,
ital punishment, a homicide which is the natural and probable consequence of a felony Is
classified as third-degree murder, punishable by fifteen years imprisonment in excess of
the maximum provided for the felony. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (West 1958).
60 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1967); PRoP. FGD. CauM. CODE § 1601(c).
Generally, in the practical application of the common law felony-murder rule or its modern
variations, the accomplice in the felony is punished as if he were the principle even though
the accomplice is not at the scene of the felony. See Bym, supra note 17, at 195.
01 For example, if a jurisdiction which required a specific intent to kill coupled with
the common law felony-murder rule were to change its rule to include only specified fel-
onies and a reckless mental state for the homicide, the application of capital punishment
would be substantially decreased. On the other hand, if a jurisdiction which required a
reckless mental state for capital murder coupled with the common law rule were to change
its rule to include specified felonies and the requirement of reckess mental state for the
homicide, the effect upon the imposition of the death penalty would be less severe.
62 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857).
63 See Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N.E. 425 (1934), aff'd per curlarn by an
equally divided court, 129 Ohio St. 245, 194 N.E. 453 (1935); State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio
St. 214, 102 N.E.2d 11 (1951). But see State v. Salter, 149 Ohio St. 264, 78 N.E.2d 575
(1948).
64 Lindsay v. State, 69 Ohio St. 215, 232, 69 N.E. 126, 131 (1903). For an excellent
historical study of the Ohio felony-murder rule, see Note, The Fclqny.-Alurdcr Rule it Ohio,
17 OHIo ST. L.J. 130 (1956). Under the present Ohio law, a purposeful killing by means
of poison does not require deliberate and premeditated malice to be first degree murder,
Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954). This provision is not included in the pro.
posed murder sections.
65 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (Page 1954).
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and has survived several codifications and revisions without substantial
change.s
Although the modern trend of criminal law revision is to limit the opera-
tion of the felony-murder doctrine or even to abolish it,07 the proposed
Ohio rule expands the scope of the present statute. Besides adding the new
offense of escape to the existing list of robbery, burglary, kidnapping and
rape,68 the drafters of the Proposed Code have eliminated the requirement of
a specific intent to kill and replaced it with a "reckless" mens tea." Like
the present Ohio law, though, the underlying felony supplies the premedita-
tion-deliberation requirement for capital murder. The drafting history of
the Proposed Code suggests that at one time in the Technical Committee's
deliberation thought was given to eliminating the Ohio felony-murder rule
due to its insignificance in a legislative scheme that would not use the pre-
meditation-deliberation formula and would apply the felony-murder theory
in the sentencing provisions. 0 But the Technical Committee in the final
draft believed that a requirement of "purposely" impermissibly narrowed
the scope of the felony-murder rule and that a reckless mental state, and
conscious disregard of a substantial homicidal risk, would be appropriate.-I
The importance of this change cannot be underestimated. Whatever the
final definition of "reddessly" becomes, the lowering of the mens Tea re-
quirement for felony-murder will multiply the instances in which the death
penalty may be imposed. The criteria that is contained in the original pro-
6 6 1a addition to the general Ohio felony-murder rule, the death of a kidnap victim also
is capital murder. OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.28 (Page 1954). This provision is re-
rained in the amended Proposed Code. PROP. O-IO CaM! CODE § 2905.01(A)(1) (as amended
in SuB. H.B. 511).
67 ALP.C § 201.2, Comment at 33-39 CTent. Draft No. 9).
6 8 See PRop. OHIO CMr. CODE § 2921.34. Changes in the present law concerning the
listed felonies by the Proposed Code will not be explored at this time. It is suflcient to
note that the application of the felony-murder doctrine may be somewhat expanded beause
the proposed list of felonies includes both the aggravated offense and the offense itself.
69 PROp. OMO CaM. CODE § 2903.01(C) (as amended in SuB. H.B. 511) reads as follows:
No person shall recklessly cause the death of another while committing or attempt-
ing to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to com-
mit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery,
aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.
SUB. I-LB. 511 added the words "or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempt-
ing to commit" to the original provision. Apparently, the addition is a codification of pres-
ent Ohio law on felony-murder. See State v. Habig, 106 Ohio St. 151, 140 N.E. 195 (1922).
(a killing in perpetration of a robbery includes a death caused by the robber a few minutes
after the offense and a short distance from its commission). It is similar to the rule in the
recent New York revision and is probably designed to eliminate some of the technical issues
concerning the completion of the underlying felony at the time of the killing. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(3) (Practice Commentary); accord, PRop. FED. CRM!r CODE § 1601(c). How-
ever, even with the specific inclusion of this provision, there is still the defense of abandon-
meat to the charge of felony-murder in New York. Sco People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440,
23 NE.2d 722, 285 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1967).
70 The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Criminal Prozedures,
Draft No. 23, Comments at 7, 10 (Apr. 17, 1967).
71 PRop. OHIO CaM!. CODE § 2903.01, Committee Comments at 71.
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posal to guide the jury's discretion in the imposition of capital punishment
point to several factors intimately connected with a felony-murder situa-
tion. 2 Therefore, in the realm of homicide offenses to which capital murder
is applicable, felony-murders are uniquely susceptible to the imposition of
the death penalty under the Proposed Code. Instead of questioning the nar-
rowness of the present felony-murder rule, the drafters of the original pro.
posal should have inquired into the efficacy of increasing the penalties for
felony-homicide that would only be manslaughter under the present law.
If the Technical Committee had looked into the problem, it would have
found that increases in legislatively provided penalties for major crimes
have little impact as a marginal general deterrentY. Therefore, the efficacy
of the decreased mens rea may not aid in the prevention of undesirable
homicidal harm.
However, the true impact of this mens rea alteration is uncertain. This
ambiguity is a product of the definition of "recklessly" that the Proposed
Code adopts. The original version of the "recklessly" provision was very
similar to the Model Penal Code formulation and required a conscious and
unjustifiable disregard that the actor's conduct may cause a certain result 4
However, the amended version of the definition of "recklessly" inserts the
language of "heedless indifference" in the place of "conscious and unjusti-
fiable." 75  The difficulty is whether "recklessly" as amended requires a
conscious disregard of the homicidal risk or whether it refers to a subjective
negligence standard like carelessness (that is, unaware of the consequences
and no desire to find out). If the latter version is the proper meaning, the
proposed felony-murder rule would encompass many homicides not in-
tended to be added to the rule by the original drafters."0
72 See PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2929.03(B)(3) (offense comitted for purpose of gain);
PROP. OHIO CaRX CODE § 2929.03(B) (4) (offense committed in order to escape apprehen-
sion or punishment for another offense).
73F. ZiMiNG, PERSPECTIVES ON DETRRENCE 89 (1971). Although any interpolation
from the FBI statistics is difficult, the conclusion that lowering the mcns rea requirements for
felony-murder in Ohio may not add to the security of life is supported by the fact that in
1970 Ohio's murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 6.6; wherea; New York in which the
felony-murder rule does not require a purpose to kill was 7.9. FEDERAL BUREAU O IN-
VESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIMNE REPORTS-1970, at 78.
7 4 Compare PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.22 (C), with M.P.C. § 2.02(2) (c) (P.O.D.).
Substantially, the provisions are the same except that the Model Penal Code spells out the
standard as a "gross deviation" from a law-abiding person's standard of conduct. In addi-
tion, the Proposed Code's use of the phrase "may cause" instead of the Model Penal Code's
formulation of "will result" seems to expand the scope of the proposed subsection.
75 PROP. OHIO CRIML. CODE § 2901.22(C) (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511):
A person acts recklessly when with heedless indifference to the consequences he
disregards a substantial risk that his conduct may cause a certain result or may be
of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when with
heedless indifference to the consequences he disregards a sub.tantial risk that such
circumstances may exist.
7 0 PROp. OHIO CRI. CODE § 2903.01, Committee Comments at 71. The Technical Com-
mittee premised its expansion of the Ohio felony-murder rule on the idea that "recklessly"
would mean a conscious disregard of a substantial homicidal rhk. However, in another
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For example, if A goes into a store to rob it and the owner of the store
dies of a heart attack, A may be guilty of felony-murder because A acted
carelessly to the risk of death in the robbery." Putting the causation prob-
lem to one side, a different result might be reached if the reckless mental
state required a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of the homicidal risk.
Under the present Ohio law requiring a specific intent to kill, however, this
incident would not fall within the ambit of felony-murder. Similarly, if X,
a rapist, drives his car carelessly and has an accident causing the death of
his rape victim, X would be, by definition, guilty of felony-murder under
the amended proposal. However, if "recklessly" required a conscious and
unjustifiable disregard of the risk, a homicide caused by careless driving
immediately following the rape would be only some form of vehicular
homicide under the proposed code. Certainly, the present Ohio rule
would be inapplicable to accidental homicides. As these examples illus-
trate, the changes that are suggested by the proposed felony-murder rule
seem to multiply the application of the doctrine and to be contradictory to
whatever lingering rationale that a felony-murder rule has in a modern crim-
inal code.
The classic formulation of the felony-murder doctrine allowing the
imputation of the mental state for murder from the mens rea of the under-
lying felony has been attacked frequently and consistently because it does
not contribute to the prevention of criminal homicides.
section the Committee suggests that their idea of conscious disregard includes the idea of
heedless indifference. See PROP. Onto CxlM. CODE § 2903.05, Committee Comments at 76.
77There are actually two separate issues involved in this example. One concerns the re-
quisite mens rea for the operation of the rule. The other deals with the problem of proxi-
mate causation. In the application of the felony-murder rule, Ohio courts have never faced
difficult causation questions because a specific intent to kill requires the consequences of a
voluntary act to be natural, reasonable and probable. Scc State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio Sr.
214, 102 N.E2d 11 (1951). Briefly, when there is a requirement of a specific intent, the
application of the "cause in fact" test is narrowed to only thoze situations evidencing that
intent. However, when the mens rea is changed to "recklessly," the scope of possible ap-
plications of the rule is expanded due to the enlarged realm of possible conduct that may
satisfy the cause in fact test. Thus, problems of proximate causation vis-a-vis the applica-
tion of the felony-murder rule have troubled courts in jurisdictions that have not required
a specific intent to kill. Generally, such states have refused to apply the felony-murder
rule when the killing was not attributable to the felony or to the volitional act of the felon.
See People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960); People v. Gil-
bert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965); Commonwealth cx Mcl. Smith
v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970); People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d
766 (1963). But see Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr.
275 (1970) (no application of the felony-murder rule but violation of the California murder
statute). The felony-murder rule would be perverted if the act of killing were ako imputed.
See Morris, supra note 56, at 68. However, jurisdictions that have rejected an expanded
notion of proximate causation in their felony-murder rule have found no problem in apply-
ing it to situations where the death may not have been the natural and probable conse-
quence of the felony. See People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rprr. 598, ccrt.
denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1969) (where the victim of a robbery died of a heart attack; held
the felony-murder rule only requires the death to be a direct causal result of the felony
regardless whether the death is the potential and probable consequence thereof.
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To punish, as a murderer, every man who, while committing a heinous
offence, causes death by pure misadventure, is a course which evidently
adds nothing to the security of human life.... The only good effect which
such punishment can produce will be to deter people from committing any
of these offences which turn into murders what are in themselves mere
accidents.... [I]t has never occurred to (a thief], nor would it occur to
any rational man, that [he is] guilty of an offence which endangers life.
.. If the punishment for stealing from the person be too light, let it be
increased, and let the increase fall alike on all the offenders.... The more
nearly the amount of punishment can be reduced to a certainty the better.
... [Hence,] the involuntary causing of death by rashness or negligence,
though always punishable, ought under no circumstances to be punished
as murder.78
Additionally, criticism has been leveled at the rule because it erodes the
essential nexus between the actor's mental state and the culpability of his
conduct which results in an indiscriminate application of its sanction."9
Although it is difficult to discover a principled argument in defense of
the common law felony-murder rule, the generally accepted rationale has
been that the criminal law should attempt to deter conduct that carries a
high likelihood of causing death.80 Thus, Justice Holmes explained that:
[I]f experience shows, or is deemed by the law-maker to show, that some-
how or other deaths which the evidence makes accidental happen dispro-
portionately often in connection with other felonies, or with resistance to
officers, or if on any other ground of policy it is deemed desirable to make
special efforts for the prevention of such deaths, the haw-maker may con-
sistently treat acts which, under the known circumstanccs, are felonious, or
constitute resistance to officers, as having a sufficiently dangerous tendency
to be put under a special ban. The law may, therefore, throw on the actor
the peril, not only of the consequences foreseen by him, but also of con-
sequences which, although not predicted by common experience, the legis-
lator apprehends.8 '
However, such justification has been rejected as having no basis in common
experience. 2  Furthermore, any retributive rationale for the felony-murder
doctrine should be dosely scrutinized in light of the other goals of criminal
sanctions and of community sentiment regarding the harm.8 3
78 CONISSIONERS ON CRaMINAL LAW, SECOND REPORT 17 (1846), quoted in 1 W. Rus,
SELL, CRrfME 563 (10th ed. 1950).
79 Packer, The Model Penal Code and Bcyond, 63 COLUM., I. REV, 594, 598 (1963);
Hooper, Some Anomalies and Development in the Law of Homiz:de, 3 U.B.C.L REV. 55,
76 (1967); Morris, supra note 56, at 60; Gegan, supra note 16, at 58687; Byrn, supra note
17, at 199; Note, 22 STAN. L Rzv. 1059, 1060 (1970). For Stephen's early attack on the
felony-murder rule as cruel and monstrous, see 3 J. STEPHEN, HIsToRY OF CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 57-75 (1883).80 Symposium, New York's Penal Law, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 211 (1969); Morris, supra note
56, at 67-68; Note, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1069 (1970).
810. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1881).
82 M.P.C. § 201.2, Comment at 38 (Tent. Draft No. 9).
83 Morris, supra note 56, at 68.
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When an intentional or recldess mental state with regard to the homi-
cide is used in a felony-murder rule instead of the common law formulation,
a strong case can be made for a deterrence justification because the rule
will focus on the homicidal behavior and not on the felonious conduct.'
The present Ohio law has operated on such an assumption, as has the Model
Penal Code, which uses the felony-murder rule as a presumption of a reck-
less homicide evidencing extreme indifference to the value of life.5 Al-
though the proposed Ohio felony-murder rule's original idea of reckless
homicide fits within this rationale, the amended definition of "recklessly"
brings the entire rule closer to the discredited common law formulation
which criminalized accidental homicide.8° Furthermore, even the original
version of "recklessly" was an anomaly in the classic Ohio theory on the
parameters of capital murder. Historically, Ohio has viewed capital pun-
ishment as only appropriate in cases that the perpetrator evidenced a pur-
pose to kill. Such conduct and mental state was thought to be not the
most deserving of the ultimate sanction but also the most suspectible to the
deterrence qualities of the death penalty. The drafters of the Proposed
Code, in keeping with the traditional Ohio policy, rejected the Model Penal
Code's concept of "reckless" murder. Nevertheless, they purported incon-
sistently to broaden the stance of the felony-murder rule.6r Such a change
will not add much to the security of life in Ohio and will probably lead to
seemingly harsh and inequitable results.
Practically, if the present Ohio rule requiring a specific intent to kill
were retained in the proposed formulation, its importance would be en-
hanced by the modification of the premeditation-deliberation formula.
Furthermore, certain homicides occurring during the perpetration of a listed
felony that would be manslaughter under the present Ohio law would be
included in the proposed murder provision.88 Thus, it would be logically
consistent with the Ohio theory on capital murder as well as sensible in
terms of forwarding the goals of the criminal law and the sanctity of life in
Ohio to require a specific intent to kill in the proposed Ohio felony-murder
rule.
84 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 1446.
S5M.P.C. § 210.2(1)(b) (P.O.D.); accord, PROP. FED. CRM. CODE § 1601(c).
sC Homicides that are unexpected should be manslaughter. 1L PERKINS, CRLIINAL LAW
44 (1969); Morris, supra note 56, at 68.
8 7 The case for a "'reckless" felony-murder rule is that an actor who engages in a felony
of violence is recklessly endangering the lives of others even though there is no intent to
kill. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 1446. This position is patently contradictory to the Ohio
policy that the ultimate sanction is appropriate only if there is a "purpose to kill."
SS If a reckless homicide committed during the perpetration of a listed felony requires a
greater sanction than manslaughter, a possible innovation in the Proposed Code would be
to place the proposed reddess felony-murder rule within the proposed murder section, while
retaining the present Ohio rule in the capital murder provision. This formulation would
be consistent with the code's theory on the gradation of aggravated offenses. Corpare
PRoP. Omo CalM. CODE § 2903.11, with PROP. Omo CamL CODE § 2903.12-.13.
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Whatever the final formulation of the mens tea requirement, considera-
tion in the code should be given to the implications of the felony-murder
rule. Much criticism of the felony-murder rule directed at its severe and
harsh applications involves the liabilities of accomplices - the driver of an
escape vehicle, a lookout, etc. - who share only the common felonious de-
sign with the actual murderer and who is unaware of any potential for homi-
cide. If criminal punishment is to be administered on the basis of an indi-
vidual's mental state and actions, accomplice liability as fully applied to the
felony-murder does not seem consistent. Recent felony-murder rule propo-
sals have attempted to expiate the harshness of accomplice liability by allow-
ing a felon who did not participate in the homicidal act to assert an affirma-
tive defense to the murder charge.8 9
Under present Ohio law an accomplice to a felony is presumed to
acquiesce in whatever may be reasonably necessary to accomplish the
felony; and if it might be reasonably expected that tie victim's life would
be endangered, then the accomplice is liable for the homicide whether or not
he was aware of the weapon used to perpetrate the homicide. 0° The pro-
posed section on accomplice liability would not significantly change this
rule. 1  The drafting history indicates that no special consideration has
been given to the accomplice liability problem. However, if the application
of the felony-murder is to be expanded, some thought should be given to
the inclusion of an affirmative defense provision in the Proposed Code to
ameliorate the harshness of the rule on accomplices and at the same time
retain concern for the value of life. A sample statute is set out below:
In the case of the prosecution of a crime under this subsection in which
the defendant was not the only participant to the underlying felony, it is
an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,
command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article
or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and
of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons;
and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical
injury.92
89 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1967); PROP. FIID. CR.M. CODD § 1601(c).
90 State v. Palfy, 11 Ohio App. 2d 142, 229 N.E.2d 76 (1967).
9 1 PROP. OMO CRIM. CODE § 2923.03.
9 2 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (3) (McKinney 1967).
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D. Capital Punishment 3
The aura of the death penalty pervades the grading system of criminal
homicides. Its impetus has created statutory distinctions to avert its imposi-
tion. In England it has been abolished. In this country it has lingered into
the twentieth century as a kind of brutal vestige of our medieval heritage.
The most salient characteristic of capital punishment is its infrequent use.
In some states like Wisconsin, it has been abolished; while in others, like
Delaware, it has been reenacted after a period of abolition. 5 Wherever
capital punishment has been retained, controversy has surrounded its con-
tinued existence. It has been attacked on a variety of moral, socio-economic,
and judicial grounds."G Moreover, the sensationalism and emotionalism
surrounding capital punishment have an undesirable impact upon the
administration of criminal justice.9 7  In the face of this mounting criticism,
however, the death penalty endures, and even though there has not been
an execution in the United States since 1967, individuals are still sentenced
to death, sometimes with increasing frequency."8
Recently, capital punishment or the mode of its imposition has been
attacked on a series of different constitutional grounds. First, in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois,"9 the United States Supreme Court held that a state could
not exclude prospective jurors in a case where the possible punishment was
death simply because the jurors had scruples about the imposition of the
93 For a legislative history of the provisions on capital punishment in the Ohio House
of Representatives, see APPENDIX II, infra.
94 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 27 (1967).
9 5 See Samuelson, Why Was Capital Punishmcnt Restored in Deaware?, 60 J. CRIm.
L.C. & P.S. 148 (1969). Mr. Samuelson suggests that the death penalty was reinstated be-
cause of four brutal and well publicized murders in southern Delaware.
6 For an excellent short synopsis of the arguments for and against capital punishment,
see The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COSrUSSION ON REFOnM OF FEDERAL CMaINAL LAws 310-11 (1971) (Intro-
ductory Comment to Chapter 36). The classic work on the deterrence aspects of the death
penalty is T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959). Other articles expositing arguments
against the retention of capital punishment include: H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENAL'TY IN
ANmErcA 166-231 (1967); T. SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNUMEtNr (1967); DiSalle, Comment on
Capital Pnishment and Clemency, 25 OHIO ST. UJ. 71 (1964); Hockkamier, The Capital Pun-
ishment Controversy, 60 J. CRM. LC. & P.S. 360 (1969); Reckless, The Use of the Deah
Penalty, 1969 CRIME & DEL. 43. Articles arguing for retention include: H. BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AamucA 120-165 (1967); Gerstein, A Prosecutor Looks at Capital
Punishment, 51 J. CRM. I.C. & P.S. 252 (1961); Van Den Hoag, On Deterrence and the
Death Peanity, 60 J. CmIa. UC. & P.S. 141 (1969) (the uncertainty of the deterrent effect
favors its retention because lives of future victims might be saved by imposing it); Note,
In Defense of Capital Punishment, 54 KY. L J. 742 (1966). For an excellent article on the
death penalty in Ohio, see Herman, An Acerbic Look at the Death Penalty in Ohio, 15 WVEST.
RES L REV. 512 (1964).
9 7 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COuRTs 27. See M.P.C. § 201.6, Comment at 64 (Tent.
Draft No. 9).
98 In Ohio the imposition of the sentence of death in first degree murder cases rose from
five in 1966 to 10 in 1968. See Ohio Judicial Criminal Statistics of the Department of
Mental Hygiene and Corrections of the State of Ohio.
99 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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penalty.' Second, in Crampton v. Ohio'01 it was argued that (1) the
combination guilt and penalty determination of the jury in a death penalty
case denied the defendant an opportunity to plead facts in mitigation of his
sentence without also giving up his privilege against self-incrimination
and (2) the absence of sentencing standards to guide jury discretion in capi-
tal cases contravenes due process of law. Both arguments were rejected by
the Court. Finally, it has been argued that the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment prohibits the further imposition of
capital punishment.10 2  Although the Court has never decided the issue,
several cases are now pending before it presenting the issue;10 3 and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that under the California constitutional
provision proscribing cruel and unusual punishment the death penalty is
unconstitutional.'0 4
Statutory provisions in this country proscribing the death penalty are,
with regard to methodology, rich in their diversity. Generally, capital pun-
ishment is reserved for certain specific crimes of violence (usually murder)
and is imposed by the jury in the same proceeding as the guilty determina-
tion'05 or after a separate hearing on the penalty.' Under the present law
in Ohio, the death penalty is reserved for a number of homicidal offenses
besides murder in the first degree. With two exceptions, 07 the jury or a
three judge panel' 08 in capital cases has the absolute discretion to recom-
mend mercy which will change the automatic imposition of capital ptuish-
0 0 1n practical application, however, prospective jurors can be excluded from a so-
called "death qualified" jury if the individual is totally opposed to the imposition of capi-
tal punishment.
101402 U.S. 183 (1971).
10 2 For a full exposition of the argument, see Goldberg and Derskowitz, Declarlng
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Goldberg and Derskowitz].
10 3 See Aikens v. California, 70 Cal.2d 369, 450 P.2d 258, 74 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1969),
cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501
cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969),
(1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Branch v. Texas, 447 SoW.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Crim.
App. 1969), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
104 People v. Anderson, 40 U.S.L.W. 2552 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1972). The Cali-
fornia court based its decision in part on the idea that the death penalty was impermissibly
cruel due to the brutal psychological tortures of impending execution. See the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, THE C-IALLENGE OV CRIM IN A
FREE SOcIETY 153 (1967) : "When a State finds that it cannot administer the penalty in [a fair
and expeditious] manner, or that the death penalty is being imposed but not carried into effect,
the penalty should be abandoned." See also TASK FORCE REPORT: TIn COURTS 28: "The
spectacle of men living on death row for years... contradicts our imsge of humane and expedi.
tious punishment of offenders."
105 See M.P.C. § 201.6, Comment at 74 (Tent. Draft No. 9).
'
00 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.35 (McKlnney
1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-10 (Supp. 1963); PA. STAT. AbrN. § 4701 (Purdon 1963);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-7(c), 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
107 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.09-.10 (Page 1954) (mandatory death sentence If the
governor or the president is assassinated).
108 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.06 (Page 1954).
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ment into a sentence of life with no hope for parole.'"" The jury, though,
is usually not given any standards to guide its discretionary determina-
tion;"1t and after the decision in Cram pton, there is no constitutional com-
pulsion on the trial court to give the jury any instructions in the area. How-
ever, the standardless jury discretion in Ohio has been severely criticized
because in this crucial decision between life and death the jury will not have
the quality of information that a judge normally would have in the sentenc-
ing process.' Furthermore, although allocution is not constitutionally
compelled, fairness and equitable principles indicate that Ohio's unitary
procedure in capital cases places too heavy a burden on the defendant to pre-
sent facts in mitigation of the infliction of capital punishment.
Although the Technical Committee desired to abolish capital punish-
ment in Ohio, 1 it decided that political expediency required the retention
of alternative sentences of death or twenty years to life imprisonment in the
original proposal." 3 However, the original proposed sections on imposing
sentences in capital cases (that is, capital murder under the original pro-
posed code) would have made two important deviations from the present
Ohio practice. First, the proceedings in a capital case were to be divided
into separate guilt and penalty determinations.1 " Instead of the present
109 There are only two other statutes in Ohio that allow the jury to mitigate a sentence
by its recommendation of mercy. See OsIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.09 (Page 1954)
(breaking and entering of an inhabited dwelling). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.141 (Page
1954) (robbery and unlawful entry of a financial institution).
1 1 0 See State v. Caldwell, 135 Ohio St. 424,21 N.E.2d 343 (1939).
111 Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
11"The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No.
23, Comments at 17 (April 17, 1967).
13 PRop. OHIO Cmr. CODE § 2929.01(A):
Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to capital murder in violation of Section
2903.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer death, or be imprisoned for an indefi-
nite term of twenty years to life, as determined pursuant to Sections 2929.02 and
2929.03 of the Revised Code.
114 PRop. OHIo CRaN. CODE § 2929.02:
(A) The jury or panel of three judges which tried the offender shall deter-
mine the penalty to be imposed for capital offense. If an offender pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the penalty shall be determined by a panel of three judges or, when
requested by the offender, by a jury impaneled for the purpose.
(B) The penalty shall be separately determined following a verdict or plea
of guilty. The jury or panel of judges shall not consider the penalty when deter-
mining the innocence or guilt of the accused, and the jury shall be so instructed
before retiring to consider its verdict.
(C) A verdict of guilty duly rendered by a properly constituted jury or panel
of judges, or a plea of guilty, is not avoided by the subsequent disability of a juror
or judge from participating in determining the penalty. In such case, vacancies
on the jury or panel of judges shall be filled in the same manner as vacancies oc-
curring during trial.
(D) Before the jury or panel of judges retires to consider the penalty to be
imposed for a capital offense, it shall hear such testimony or other evidence as may
be presented, the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if any, of
the counsel for the defense and prosecution, relevant to the penalty which should
be imposed on the offender. The court then shall instruct the jury on its duties in
determining the penalty.
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procedure of death unless there is a recommendation of mercy, the jury to
impose death in the penalty proceeding would have had to find affirma-
tively for death by a unanimous vote. This would have placed squarely
upon the shoulders of the jury the onerous decision of life or death rather
than allowing death to be imposed by default. In addition, in partial re-
sponse to criticism aimed at the lack of any opportunity for allocution in
the present Ohio practice, the penalty phase would have included an oppor-
tunity for the defendant to present arguments, testimony, and other evi-
dence relating to the appropriate penalty."n  Second, criteria similar to the
Model Penal Code's formulation would have acted as a guide for the here-
tofore standardless discretion of the jury in a capital case."' The enumer-
(E) The jury or panel of judges shall give due consideration to the criteria con-
tained in Section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, in determining the penalty to be
imposed on an offender for a capital offense.
(F) The death penalty shall be imposed upon the concurrence therein of all
members of the jury or panel of judges, otherwise imprisonment shall be imposed.
When the death penalty is returned, the clerk of court shall poll the jury or panel
of judges to verify the concurrence therein of each member.
(G) The court shall impose on the offender the penalty provided in Section
2929.01, determined pursuant to this section and Section 2929.03 of the Revised
Code.
115The original proposed procedure was similar to the one presently in operation In
California. See CAL. PENAL. LAw § 190.1 (West 1970). See also M.P.C. § 210.6(2) (P.O.D.);
PROP. FED. CRM. CODE § 3602.
"1 PROP. OMo CRIM. CODE § 2929.03:
(A) In determining whether to impose death or imprisonment for a capital
offense, the jury or panel of judges shall consider the nature end circumstances of the
offense, and the history, character, and condition of the offender.
(B) The following shall be considered in favor of imposing the death penalty
for a capital offense:
(1) The offense endangered the security, or was intended to endanger the se-
curity of this or any other state or the United States.
(2) The offense was the assassination, committed for racial, religious, or po.
itical reasons, of a high public official, candidate for high public office, or per-
son of renown or veneration.
(3) The offense was committed for hire, or for purpose of gain.
(4) The offense was committed in order to escape detection, apprehension,
trial, or punishment for another offense.
(5) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer engaged in his
duties at the time of the offense.
(6) The victim of the offense was a child under eighteen, an aged or infirm
person, or a person who was particularly unoffending or defenseless.
(7) The victim of the offense was tortured or cruelly abused.
(8) The offender has willfully killed, or attempted to willfully kill more than
one person, including the victim of the offense at bar.
(C) The following shall be considered in favor of imposing imprisonment
for a capital offense:
(1) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(2) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(3) There are circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though failing
to establish a defense.
(4) The offender acted under strong provocation.
(5) The offender has no history of prior assaultive offenses.
(6) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to rehabilitative treatment.
This set of aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be compared to the formula.
tion of the Model Penal Code. See M.P.C. § 210.6(3-4) (P.O.D.).
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ated standards were not intended to be exclusive but were to be considered
with other circumstances within the knowledge of the jury including the
nature of the offense and the condition of the defendant. The original
proposal promised to be a sharp departure from the present practice which
at the very least would have given not only a semblance of rationality to the
imposition of the death penalty but also a suggestion of fairness because it
would have permitted the defendant a chance to mitigate his sentence with-
out incriminating himself.
However, the amended version of the capital sentencing provisions
marks a return to the present Ohio law concerning capital punishment" 7
Among other things, the scope of capital punishment is expanded from the
original proposal to include kidnapping for ransom if the victim is not
117 PRop. OIO CRML CODE § 2929.01(A),(C)-(E) (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511):
(A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to capital murder in violation of
section 2903.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer death, unless the jury or panel of
judges trying the accused recommends that mercy be shown him, in which case
he shall be imprisoned for life. In addition, the offender may be fined an amount
fixed by the court, but not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.
(C) The court shall not impose a fine in addition to imprisonment or death
for capital murder, or in addition to imprisonment for murder, unless the offense
was committed for hire or for purpose of gain.
(D) The court shall not impose a fine or fines for capital murder or murder
which, in the aggregate and to the extent not suspended by the court, exceeds
the amount which the offender is or will be able to pay by the method and within
the time allowed without undue hardship to himself or his dependents, or will
prevent him from making reparation for the victim's wrongful death.
(E) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to kidnapping for ransom in
violation of division (a)(1) of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer death,
unless the jury or panel of judges trying the accused recommends that mercy be
shown him, in which case he shall be imprisoned for life. If the offender releases
the victim in a safe place unharmed, whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to
kidnapping for ransom shall be imprisoned for an indefinite term of ten years to
life.
PROP. OIHo CRML CODE § 2929.02 (as amended in SUB. -LB. 511):
(A) The jury or panel of three judges which tries the offender shall determine
whether or not to recommend that mercy be shown him for a capital offense- If
an offender pleads guilty to a capital offense, whether or not to recommend that
mercy be shown shall be determined by a panel of three judges or, when requested
by the offender, by a jury impaneled for the purpose.
(B) The jury or panel of judges shall give due consideration to the criteria
contained in section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, in determining whether or not
to recommend that mercy be shown an offender for a capital offense.
(C) A recommendation of mercy shall be returned upon the concurrence there-
in of a majority of the members of the jury or panel of judges. If a recommendation
of mercy is returned, the court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment upon the
offender. Otherwise, the court shall impose sentence of death, as provided in sec-
tion 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
PRop. OHIo CRlM CODE § 2929.03 (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511):
(A) In determining whether or not to recommend that mercy be shown an
offender for a capital offense, the jury or panel of judges shall consider the nature
and drcumstances of the offense, and the history, character, and condition of the
offender.
(B) The following do not control the discretion of the jury or Panel of judges,
but shall be considered against recommending that mercy be shown an offender
for a capital offense:
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returned safely."18 In addition, the amended proposal again places the
guilt and penalty determinations in a unitary form and requires death to be
imposed unless the jury by a majority recommends mercy. However, the
amended version with some changes retains the suggested criteria of the
original proposal although carefully warning that such standards do not
control the jury's discretion.
Formulations like the original proposal have been closely scrutinized.
The bulk of criticisms has been directed against the "abstract and sterile"
criteria suggested to guide the usual standardless discretion of the jury in
capital cases. Moreover, it is contended with some validity that the actual
effect of the suggested standards will be to diffuse the sentencing authority's
sense of personal responsibility.119 This diffusion, though, is unaccom-
panied by any increase in rationality because it has been found that the jury
as the voice of the community does reach a rational, just and equitable result
without the aid of expressed standards. 20 Similarly, the bifurcated proce-
dure has been criticized because it does not add any more information for
the jury's perusal than they would otherwise learn or know while at the
(1) The offense endangered the security, or was intended to endanger the se-
curity of this or any other state or the United States;
(2) The offense was the assassination, committed for racial, religious, or political
reasons, of a high public official, candidate for high public office, or person of re-
nown or veneration;
(3) The offense was committed for hire, or for purpose of gain;
(4) The offense was committed in order to escape detection, apprehension,
trial, or punishment for another offense;
(5) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer engaged in his
duties at the time of the offense;
(6) The victim of the offense was a person who was particularly unoffending
or defenseless;
(7) The offender killed the victim from ambush;
(8) The victim of the offense was tortured or cruelly abused;
(9) The offender has willfully killed, or attempted to willfully kill more than
one person, including the victim of the offense at bar.
(C) The following do not control the discretion of the jury or panel of judges,
but shall be considered in favor of showing mercy to an offender for a capital of-
fense:
(1) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
(2) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(3) There are circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though failing
to establish a defense;
(4) The offender acted under strong provocation;
(5) The offender has no history of prior offenses of violence;
(6) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to rehabilitate [sia] treat-
ment.
(D) The criteria listed in Divisions (B) and (C) of thi; section shall not be
construed to limit the matters which may be considered in determining whether
or not to recommend that mercy be shown an offender for a capital offense.
'
1 8 See PROP. OHxo CRIM. CODE § 2905.01(A)(1) (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511). This
statute is a reenactment of Ohio's "Little Lindberg" law. OHIO REV. COD ANN, § 2901.28
(Page 1954).
191 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 60, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183 (1971).
12 0 See Comment, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First Degree Murder Cases,
21 STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1969).
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same time allowing the prosecution to show how "jaded" the defendant
really is.12
1
However, this analysis seems to disregard any rationale of sentencing.
If the death penalty is to be retained because it is a necessary instrument
to effect the goals of the criminal law, it should be given the aura of reason-
ableness. A bifurcated procedure requiring the jury to find affirmatively
for death coupled with suggested criteria to guide the jury's unlimited dis-
cretion would contribute to the idea of a rational deliberation and determina-
tion. At the very least the jury should have the same type of information
that would be available to a sentencing judge. Due to the various rules of
evidence and procedures applicable to a criminal trial, though, certain infor-
mation will be withheld from their penalty considerations. Certainly, mak-
ing a decision concerning life and death on less than all the possible infor-
mation available is not as reasonable as a decision based upon all pertinent
data. A bifurcated procedure would allow the jury to have access to all
available information, while at the same time safeguarding the defendant's
rights during the guilt determination. Furthermore, suggested criteria
would be necessary to help the jury to evaluate the information within their
knowledge. Although the cost of administering a bifurcated system may
be greater than the present practice, it would be slight in comparison to the
addition of rationality and competency that a bifurcated procedure would
bring into an area where the difference between life and death falls upon
the decisions of twelve individuals untrained in the law.
A return to the shape of the present law is unfortunate. But the reten-
tion in the amended proposals on capital sentencing of the suggested criteria
to guide the jury's discretion without including an affirmative obligation to
find for capital punishment has the feared propensity to soothe the con-
sciences of the jurors. If the new Ohio law on capital punishment is to
include criteria to guide the discretion of the jury, it should also place the
burden of affirmatively finding for death upon the jury to neutralize the
possibility of the imposition of the death penalty by default because the
defendant did not meet any mitigating circumstances. Moreover, the addi-
tion of a bifurcated procedure would aid not only the defense but also, at
times, the prosecution. A system for the imposition of capital punishment,
like the one originally proposed, would add rationality, fairness and equity
to the present practice which is possibly susceptible to the whims of a partic-
ular location or time. More important, if capital punishment has any
degree of deterrent value, it would benefit from the greater certainty neces-
sary for an effective deterrent that the original proposal would contribute.
In the terms of the goals of the criminal law such a system should be
adopted in Ohio.
121 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 116, 124, McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971).
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Any lengthy discussion of the death penalty inevitably ends where it
began. There have been no executions in this country for over five years.
Some states although not abolishing capital punishment have discarded
their implements of death. Another state has declared that the death pen-
alty contravenes its ideas of cruel and unusual punishment.122 As the mora-
torium on executions continues in anticipation of the United States Su-
preme Court's pronouncement on the constitutionality of the death penalty,
the ranks of death row swell. The spectacle of the lingering death contin-
'tes. But somehow the concept of the executions of those individuals seems
grossly unreal. As one commentator has observed: "The spectre of mass
executions - after a moratorium of more than [five] years - threatens to
further brutalize a nation already saturated with war, riot, and crime. This
generation of Americans has experienced enough killing."'123
III. MANSLAUGHTER2 4
At English common law a homicide that was committed without malice
aforethought was classified as manslaughter and was not susceptible to the
imposition of capital punishment.125 From this basic concept separate identi-
fiable categories within the offense of manslaughter developed. One cate-
gory which was interrelated with the premeditation-deliberation formula
permitted the mitigation of an intentional homicide that otherwise would
be murder if the offender's self-control was overwhelmed by a "heat of pas-
sion" that was caused by "adequate provocation."' 20 Another type of man-
slaughter classification proscribed unintended homicides that were proxi-
mately caused by an unlawful act.127 A third class included homicide that
was caused by culpable negligence.128 In one form or another all modern
manslaughter statutes have enacted these basic manslaughter categories.2
Ohio's manslaughter statute is typical of the formulations in this coun-
122There is presently some discussion in California concernng an initiative campaign
to constirutionaize the death penalty. It would be interesting to see if the people of that
state are inclined to include capital punishment within their basic charter.
12 3 Goldberg v. Dershowitz, supra note 98, at 1819.
124 For a legislative history of the proposed manslaughter provisions in the Ohio House
of Representatives, see APPENDIX III, infra.
125 Wechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 717.
126 Id. See Gegan, supra note 16, at 570.
12TWechsler and Michael, supra note 1, at 717. This classification is normally referred
to as the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, an analogue of the felony-murder rule. Actually,
in jurisdictions that do not adhere to the common law felony-murder rule, it is a misnomcr
because felonies other than the listed ones as well as misdemeanors activate the unlawful
act doctrine.
128 See M.P.C. § 201.3, Comment at 42 (Tent. Draft No. 9).
129 Id. Commonly, manslaughter is graded on the basis of first degree-second degree
or voluntary-involuntary. Thus, first degree or voluntary manslaughter includes intentional,
provoked homicides, while second degree or involuntary manslaughter is reserved for the op.
eration of the unlawful act doctrine. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. § 4703 (Purdon 1963).
(Vol. 33
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
try-"' Although it only directs that "no person shall unlawfully kil an-
other,"' 31 it has been interpreted to include both involuntary (the unlaw-
ful act doctrine) and voluntary (the provocation formula) manslaughter.'"
Since traditionally the two degrees of murder have required a purpose to
kill and the felony-murder rule has been narrowly applied, the Ohio man-
slaughter statute has been utilized very broadly. However, while possibly
being overinclusive in its effect, Ohio's manslaughter statute is at the same
time underinclusive. In other words the statute would ciminalize con-
duct that is considered not very culpable, such as a pure food violation
premised on strict liability, and at the same time it would be inapplicable
to a more culpable homicide.' 33 The structuring and grading of the man-
slaughter categories in the proposed code has been a controversial and dif-
ficult task. It is highly uncertain what shape the final provisions will take.
However, the impact of the various proposals can be examined to deter-
mine the efficacy of their enactment into the proposed Ohio law of homi-
cide.
A. The Provocation Formula (Voluntary Manslaughter)
Although some states have distorted the provocation formula and have
made it a narrow category of unintended homicide,13' Ohio has continu-
ally viewed provocation as a mitigating factor in a purposeful killing. The
classic statement of the Ohio rule declares that
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful and intentional killing of a human
being while the slayer is under the influence of a sudden passion or heat of
blood produced by an adequate and reasonable provocation and before a
reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to assume its
habitual control.... [Ilt is considered that the adequate provocation re-
sulting in sudden passion or heat of blood has momentarily deprived the
accused of his reason and he is impelled to act by reason of the provoca-
tion and is, therefore, without the capacity to reflect.'35
In addition, it has been determinated that in Ohio mere words are insuf-
ficient provocation and that as a matter of law twenty-four hours is suf-
ficient time to cool. 36
130 Omo R v. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954).
1311d. The violation of a municipal ordinance will not satisfy the unlawful act require-
ment. State v. Collingsworth, 82 Ohio St. 154,92 N.E. 22 (1910).
132-See State v. McDaniel, 103 Ohio App. 163, 144 N.E.2d 683 (1956), appeal dimintd,
166 Ohio St. 378, 142 N.E.2d 654 (1957).
133 See The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft
No. 23-3 (Legislative Service Commission's Criminal Law Study on Reckless or Mitigated
Homicide, Apr. 21, 1970).
134 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1967) (Practice Commentary).
135 State v. Carter, 75 Ohio App. 545, 554-55, 58 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1944). Sce 4 O.J.L
-- CmimIAL § 457.25 (1970).
'
36 State v. Elliott, 11 Dec. Repr. 332 (Franklin County C.P. 1891).
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Like the common law formula, the present Ohio provocation rule fo-
cuses on the character and sufficiency of the provocative conduct.187 Thus,
three questions are customarily asked in determining whether to reduce an
intentional killing from murder to manslaughter: (1) whether the provo-
'cation was adequate enough to cause a reasonable man to lose his self-
control; (2) whether such provocation caused the defendant to lose his
self-control; and (3) whether the killing took place while the defendant
was not under the control of his rational faculies. 138  However, if the
policy of the provocation formula is to recognize the "frailty of human na-
,ture" and the exceptional cases where the legal prohibition fails to affect
conduct,139 the present Ohio rule has been only partially cognizant. Prov-
ocation rules stressing the suddenness of the reaction to the provocative
conduct and the source and degree of such conduct gauged by objective
standards have been criticized because they fail to consider the compound-
ing of provocation over a period of time and the defendant's beliefs in
judging the circumstances about him.140  Therefore, in response to the
deterrence rationale of the rule, modern statements of the provocation
formula have moved away from focusing on the provocative conduct and
instead have stressed the defendant's mental state vis-.-vis his beliefs con-
cerning his situation.141
The original manslaughter provision in the Proposed Code included
categories of reckless homicide, a narrowed version of the misdemeanor-
manslaughter rule and a modification of the present Ohio provocation for-
mula along the lines of the Model Penal Code. 42 The drafting history of
13 7 See Moreland, A Re-examination of the Law of Homicide in 1971: The Model Penal
Code, 59 KY. L.J. 788, 805 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Moreland]; Note, Manslaughtcr and
the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasorableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L REV.
1021 (1958).
138 State v. Carter, 75 Ohio App. 545, 555,58 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1944).
339 Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable lan, 1954 CRLIf. L. REV, (Eng.) 740, 742
[hereinafter cited as Williams].
140M.P.C. § 201-3, Comment at 46-48 (Tent. Draft. No. 9); Gegan, supra noto 16, at
570-72; Moreland, supra note 137, at 806; 106 U. Pa. L. Rev., supra note 137, at 1037. But sa
Byrn, supra note 17, at 183 (the irresistible impulse test covers all stuations where it is desirable
and possible to take notice of diminished capacity to conform).
141 See M.P.C. § 210.3(1)(b) (P.O.D.); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (Mclinney 1967);
PROP. FED. CRIM. CODE § 1602(b).
142 PROP. OHIO CluM. CODE § 2903.03:
(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress for which there is rea-
sonable explanation or excuse, shall knowingly cause the death of another. The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the view-
point of a person in the offender's situation at the time of the offense, under cir-
cumstances as he believed them to be.
(B) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An offense under
Section 2903.05 of the Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this
division.
(C) No person shall cause the death of another by committing any offense of
violence. An offense under section 2903.05 or 2903.06 of the Revised Code does
not constitute an offense under this division.
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the original proposal suggests that the present Ohio law on provocation
was considered to be too narrow to effectuate the policy of the provocation
formula and that the defendant's emotional state at the time of the crim-
inal act was more crucial to a determination of provocation than the cause
of the disturbance'4 3 In addition, like the Model Penal Code manslaughter
provision, the original proposal attempted to mitigate the sometimes harsh
objectivity of the present law by considering the subjective element of the
defendant's viewpoint. However, the subjective analysis would not have
included all of the defendant's individual peculiarities because the final
test of sufficiency of the explanation was an objective one. In other words,
a defendant's erroneous impression of certain circumstances would have
been taken into account but a defendant's peculiar susceptibility to a par-
ticular stimulus would not.'" Thus, under the original proposal on the
provocation formula, two questions would have been asked in determining
whether the "provocation" mitigated an intentional killing: (1) Did the
defendant act while under extreme emotional stress, and (2) Taking into
consideration the defendant's situation as he believed it to be, was there a
reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional stress? As originally
proposed, all manslaughter categories were to be felonies of the third de-
gree.-'45
Although some thought was given in the committee sessions of the Gen-
eral Assembly to upgrading the provocation formula to a felony of the
second degree and making it only applicable to the murder offense without
changing any substance of the original proposal, 40 the amended provision
on the provocation formula materially altered the original proposal and
partially returned to the nomenclature of the present Ohio law of volun-
tary manslaughter. 47  Two significant changes from the original proposal
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the
third degree.
The original proposal on the provocation formula that uses the mental element of "know-
ingly" would have mitigated both capital murder and murder situations. Sce PROP. Oto
CMI . CODE § 2901.22(E). Hence, the proposal would be no different in application than
the present Ohio law.
143The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No.
23, Comments at 15 (Apr. 17, 1967). Shifting the focus of the provocation formula to the
mental state of the defendant will not completely disregard the element of the provocative
conduct. On the other hand, particularly rigid rules of sufficiency will be inapplicable and the
"reasonable explanation or excuse" will be judged in light of all the circumstances of the caze.
MLP.C. § 201.3, Comment at 47 (Tent. Draft No. 9).
144 See Danforth, supra note 5, at 165; Gegan, supra note 16, at 571-73; Widliams, strfPra
note 139, at 747. A suggested difficulty with an entirely subjective test is the possibility of
greater punishment for a person of self-control than for a highly excitable person. Sce 106
U. PA. L. REv., supra note 137, at 1037.
145 The maximum penalty for a felony of the third degree is four to 10 years. PRop.
OHo Cm m. CODE § 2929.04(B)(3).
34 6 The maximum penalty for a felony of the second degree is six to 15 years. PrOP.
OHtO CaML CODE § 2929.04(B)(2).
'47PRop. OFHo CRM. CODE § 2903.03 (as amended in SuB. H.B. 511):
(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious
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deserve dose scrutiny. First, the penalty for voluntary manslaughter
was increased to a felony of the first degree.148  This increase makes the
proposed punishment for the offense substantially longer than the present
penalty,14 9 and evidences a dissatisfaction with the lack of severity of the
present law. The rationale for this change is uncertain. A "knowing"
homicide that was committed while the perpetrator was under an extreme
emotional stress is considered generally of greater culpability than the
other categories enumerated under the original manslaughter proposal.
Therefore, such a homicide is deserving of harsher treatment. However,
the magnitude of the change seems to be out of proportion to the theoreti-
cal foundations of the provocation formula that purports to mitigate an
intentional homicide because the defendant's acts were so controlled by his
emotions that he lacked the required mental state for murder160
Second and more importantly, the amended proposal seems to reinstate
the present provocation formula. Although the language would indicate
more of an amalgamation of the original proposal and the present law, the
amended proposal once again focuses upon the objective sufficiency of the
provocative conduct and deletes the idea that the reasonableness of the
provocation should be determined from the defendant's viewpoint. This
return to the present raises doubts about the application of the provocation
formula to mental distress built up over a long duration. Furthermore, the
harshness of the pure objective test fails to consider the defendant who is
mistaken about the provocative circumstances. Taking into consideration
the defendant's position would clarify the objective evaluation of the pro-
vocative cause of the extreme emotional distress and would allow a defen-
dant who is mistaken to be prosecuted for manslaughter and not for mur-
der.
Whatever the final shape of the statute on voluntary manslaughter,
though, the provocation formula is but a compromising recognition that
provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force, shall know-
ingly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a felony
of the first degree.
148 The maximum penalty for a felony of the first degree is 10 to 25 years imprisonment.
PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2929.04(B)(1).
149 The maximum penalty for manslaughter under the present Ohio law is one to 20
years imprisonment. OFHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954).
150 A possible explanation for this change might be derived from an outmoded idea on
the effect of deterrence:
For whatever the motive to kill, the threat of unwelcome treatment at the hands
of the law provides a competing motive to refrain from killin .... [I]t cannot be
denied that the creation of the motive may not only lead selfish and deliberate men
to refrain from homicide . . . , but may also lead altruistic men to endeavor to
serve their altruistic ends in non-homicidal ways and excitable men to control
their excitement, whatever its cause. In short, it cannot be denied in general
that men may be led to control their passions by the threat of unpleasant treat-
ment if they do not do so.
Wechsler and Michael supra note 1, at 735-36.
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deterrence at times fails to stop men from acting with homicidal intent.
Yet, testing provocation in terms of the reasonable man seems illusory.
As Glanville Williams observed, '[H]ow can it be admitted that the para-
gon of virtue, the reasonable man, gives way to provocation?" '' In the
final analysis the real issue is whether the actor's loss of self-control can be
understood by the jury in terms that arouse sympathy enough to call for
mitigation in sentence.Y52
B. Reckless Homicide (Involuntary Manslaughter)
As originally proposed, reckless homicide was to be one of three cate-
gories making up the offense of manslaughteril However, the amended
proposal labels the offense of reckless homicide as involuntary manslaughter
punishable like the original manslaughter proposal as a felony of the third
degree.' T  Most modern applications of reckless homicide include it in
either a unitary definition of manslaughter 55 or in a lesser classification
than the provocation formula. 6
There is no provision in the present Ohio law comparable to the idea
of reckless homicide. The present offense of involuntary manslaughter
encompasses the unlawful act doctrine which was criticized by the drafters
of the original proposal as both underinclusive and overinclusive in its
operation. Additionally, the unlawful act doctrine was criticized because
it fit poorly in a system of grading criminal offenses based upon a defen-
dant's conduct and state of mind. The drafters believed that "the designa-
tion of the culpable mental state [was] a much more refined and better
tailored solution to describe the same evils as a blanket provision covering
violation of any statute."' 57  Thus, a "reckless" mens rea was used to
criminalize homicides in which the perpetrator ignored a substantial likeli-
hood of a homicidal risk." s
If "recklessly" were defined as originally proposed, reckless homicide
would exclude deaths proximately related to strict liability offenses unlike
a'5'Williams, supra note 134, at 742.
152 J.p.C. § 201.3, Comment at 48 (Tent. Draft No. 9); Byrn, supra note 17, at 179.
153 Supra note 142.
'm PRop. Omo Can. CODE § 2903.04 (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511):
(A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An offense under
section 2903.06 of the Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this sec-
tion.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a felony
of the third degree.
155 !LP.C. § 210.3 (P.O.D.); PROP. FED. CaM. CODE § 1602.
156 N.Y. PEItAL LAw § 125.15 (McKinney 1967) (manslaughter in the zecond degree).
157 lie Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No.
23, Comments at 14 (Apr. 17, 1967).
158 For examples of the operation of the reckless homicide provision applying the Model
Penal Code definition of "recklessly," see PROP. OHIO CaM!. CODE § 2903.03, Comments at
74.
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the unlawful act doctrine and would criminalize reckless conduct proxi-
mately related to a homicide even though the conduct did not involve the
violation of a statute. This would be in keeping with the policy and pur-
pose of a criminal code to prevent physical harm by punishment and
deterrence. However, as the discussion on the felony-murder rule pointed
out, the amended definition of "recklessly" leaves in doubt the exact im-
pact of the reckless homicide provision.
If "recklessly" is interpreted to mean a subjective negligence standard
instead of a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of a substantial homicidal
risk, various anomalies in the system of gradation will be created. For
example, if X were handling acid and acting with "heedless indiffer-
ence" to any potential homicidal consequences and such "carelessness"
caused the death of another, X would be prosecuted under the involuntary
manslaughter even though he was unaware of any substantial homicide
risk. If he were found guilty, he could receive a maximum sentence of
imprisonment of 4 to 10 years.159 On the other hand, if Y were playing with
a gun and failing to exercise due care toward a substantial risk and the
gun discharged killing another, Y would be prosecuted under the negligent
homicide provision60 and could receive a maximum sentence of imprison-
ment of six months. The different treatment of X and Y does not seem
logical compared with their similar mental states and conduct. The result
is even less consistent with the classification theory of the code that con-
siders the use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating factor.101 If the orig-
inal definition of "recklessly" were used, X's conduct would be either non-
criminal or, if it violated a statute, negligent homicide.
IV. LESSER HOMICIDES
A. Negligent Homicide
Criminal negligent homicide at common law was one of the categories
of manslaughter.1 3  The culpable negligence standard, though, was not
tied to the idea of ordinary tort negligence but rather turned upon a gross
deviation from an ordinary standard of care. 01  This idea of a "gross
negligence" standard has continued in modern formulations of the of-
fense of negligent homicide.'05 Many of these recent enactments have
159 PROP. OHIO CRM. CODE § 2929.04(B)(3).
160 PROP. OHIO CR u. CODE § 2903.05 (as amended in SUE. H.B. 511).
161 Compare PROP. OHIo C. CODE § 2903.11, with PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.12-
.13.
162 For a legislative history of the proposed provisions on negligent and vehicular homi-
cides in the Ohio House of Representatives, see APPENDIX III, inIra.
163 For a short history of the common law development of negligent homicide, see Byrn,
supra note 17, at 203.
164 See M.P.C. § 201.4, Comment at 50 (Tent. Draft No. 9); Bvrn, supra note 17, at 203.
10 5 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.10 (Mcinney 1967); M.P.C. § 210.4 (P.O.D.); PROP,
FED. CRIM. CODE § 1603.
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been directed at the problem of vehicular homicides because the fact of
jury nullification made it very difficult to accuse anyone involved in a fatal
auto accident of manslaughter.'00 Thus, negligent homicide has filtered out
of manslaughter and has become a separate offense.
Although the concept of criminalizing negligent conduct seems to be
firmly entrenched in Anglo-American jurisprudence, there has been a ser-
ious challenge to the propriety of criminalizing inadvertence when the
policy of the criminal code stresses deterrence goals. Hence, on the one
hand it is argued that criminalizing negligence, even gross negligence, adds
nothing to the deterrence factor of the criminal law because the threat of
punishment has no effect upon an actor who is unaware of the substantial
risk of harm."' Instead culpable negligence reenforces the retributive
goals of the criminal law that strike out indiscriminately at the conse-
quences of conduct without regard to the mental state of the actor. 13S On
the other hand it is asserted that although generally negligence should be
insufficient to impose criminal liability, it is adequate when a maximum
preventive effort requires an additional motive to cause an individual to
take care before acting.'-" Since the prevention of physical harm is one
of the primary goals of a rational criminal code, the criminalization of
conduct evidencing a gross deviation from the normal standard of conduct
should stand as a warning to individuals to be alert to homicidal risks.
When the standard is gross negligence, ignorance of such substantial cir-
cumstances passes beyond inadvertence and infringes on the realm of in-
competence.' However, a statute punishing gross negligence should give
reference to the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the sanction
if alertness is to be prompted.17 '
There is no offense in the present Ohio criminal law that punishes inad-
vertent homicide. Negligent homicides are either criminal because they are
proximately related to the violation of an offense (involuntary manslaugh-
ter) or non-criminal and punished by civil sanctions. Since negligent
vehicular homicides were treated specially in the Proposed Code,12 the orig-
'
6 6 See M.P.C. § 201.4, Comment at 53-55 (Tent. Draft No. 9).
16 7 G. WILLIAMS, CRiNuAL LAW: GENERAL PART 122-23 (1961); Byrn, supra note 17
at 207-08; Collings, Negligent Murder-Some Stateside Footnotes to Director of Publi Pros-
ecutions v. Smith, 49 CAL. L. REV. 254, 286 (1961) (hereinafter cited as Collings]; Hall,
Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLML L REV. 632 (1963).
168 G. WILLIams, CRim , AL LAW: GENERAL PART 122 (1961); Collings, supra note 167,
at 285.
1' 9 See M.P.C. § 201.4, Comment at 53 (Tent. Draft No. 9); Wechsler, supra note 3, at
1439; Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA.
L REV. 401 (1971). The opposition to criminalizing negligence has recently been criti-
cized because it inconsistently holds everyone to strict liability in knowing the law but re-jects punishing anyone ignorant of factual risks. 119 U. PA. L REV. at 420.
170 Byrn, supra note 17, at 209.
'7' Id.
1'2 See PRoP. OMO CErTL COOB §§ 2903.06-.07 (as amended in SuB. I.B. 511).
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inal proposal on negligent homicide (unchanged by the amended version)
criminalizing only negligent conduct in regard to deadly weapons and ord-
nance was very narrow in its application.Y Putting to one side the con-
troversy over the criminalization of negligent behavior, the original pro-
posal seemed to be justified by the great potential for harm and the pos-
sibility of effective deterrent value.1 7 4
However, the difficulty in the original proposal that continues in the
amended version is the definition of "negligently."1 75 When "negligently"
is defined, as it is in the Proposed Code, to refer to ordinary tort negligence
(that is, a simple deviation from the standard of due care required by the
circumstances), much of the argument for the criminalization of negligent
behavior is frustrated. Furthermore, it is hard to see how the security of
human life is enhanced by the punishment of inadvertence not involving
a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care.'Y0 Although the
criminal law in condemning negligent homicide may not be impotent to
stimulate care that may not otherwise be taken, such stimulation will un-
doubtedly only alert an actor to the grossest inadvertence. If tort negli-
gence is used to define negligent homicide, the retributive goal of the
criminal law is re-enforced without adding to any deterrence justification.
Therefore, to receive the full benefit of the negligent homicide offense, a
gross negligence standard should be utilized.
Besides including the specific provision on inadvertent homicide, the
amended version of the proposed negligent homicide statute also contains
the unlawful act doctrine or the "misdemeanor-manslaughter" rule."" Un-
173 PRop. O-no CIUM. CODE § 2903.04:
(A) No person shall negligently cause the death of another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised
Code.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a misde-
meanor of the first degree.
174 For examples of the operation of the original proposal on negligent homicide, see
PRop. OMo CRM. CODE § 2903.04, Committee Comments at 75.
175 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.22(D):
A person acts negligently when he fails to exercise due care to perceive or avoid
a risk that his conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature.
A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when he fails to exercise due
care to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
176 G. WLLiAms, CImuiNAL LAW: GENmAL PAT 122 (1961).
177 But see Annot, 20 A.L.R.3d 473, 476 (1968) (negligence in a statute punishing
negligent homicide usually refers to ordinary negligence distinguished from criminal or
gross negligence). The Technical Committee viewed the negligent homicide section as an im.
portant weapons control provision. See PROP. OIO CIUM. CODE § 2903.04, Committee Com-
ments at 75. However, a homicide provision seems like an inappropriate vehicle to control
weapons. If the drafters of the code were serious about weapons control, they should have
created a separate and well-delineated statute.
178 PROp. OHIo CRIM. CODE § 2903.05 (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511):
(A) No person shall negligently cause the death of another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordinance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised
Code.
(B) No person shall cause the death of another by committing any offense.
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der the present Ohio law, the unlawful act doctrine is encompassed in the
concept of involuntary manslaughter.," As it has been noted previously,
the concept suffers at the same time from being overinclusive and underin-
clusive. 80 The unlawful act doctrine has been criticized because it has no
place in a modern criminal code which grades offenses according to cul-
pable mental states and conduct and because there is no basis in experi-
ence to presume that a particular mental state in relation to the homicide
is satisfied by the mens rea requirement of the underlying offense.""'
The original manslaughter proposal lumped the unlawful act doctrine
with other categories but limited its application to only offenses of viol-
ence." 2 Although it would be patently sensible not to include the unlaw-
ful act doctrine as a classification of criminal liability, the inclusion of the
concept within the amended proposal on negligent homicide seems to be
a realistic appraisal of its value in a modern criminal code. However, even
this treatment of the unlawful act doctrine will criminalize not only negli-
gent conduct but also homicides caused by the violation of strict liability
offenses. This latter application of the doctrine does not fuffill any deter-
rence value of the criminal law and seems only to satisfy a goal of retribu-
tion without adding to the security of human life. The goals of the crim-
inal law would not suffer significantly if the unlawful act doctrine were
deleted entirely from criminal liability and such harm were treated with
civil sanctions.
B. Vehicular Homicide
Homicides caused by the operation of motor vehicles (that is, automo-
biles, locomotives, watercraft and aircraft) may be treated by a criminal
code in several different ways. Of course, vehicular homicides committed
under the appropriate circumstances would be susceptible to the application
of the capital murder, murder or manslaughter provisions of a typical penal
code.' An acceptable method to deal with vehicular homicides caused by
inadvertent conduct which would recognize the deterrence value of civil
sanctions would be not to criminalize them at all. Generally, though,
prior to the recent wave of penal code revisions, vehicular homicides that
An offense under section 2903.06 or 2903.07 of the Revised Code does not con-
stitute an offense under this division.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a misde-
meanor of the first degree.
V 9 O1o REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Page 1954).
180 Some mitigation of the problem of overinclusiveness may be found in Black v.
State, 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N..E 795 (1921). In Black the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted
the precursor of the present unlawful act doctrine to refer to unlawful acts that could be
reasonably anticipated by an ordinary prudent person as likely to result in a homicide.
-
81 See Byrn, supra note 17, at 203; Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUm.
L REV. 594, 599 n.21 (1963).
.82 PRop. Orno CRM. CODE § 2903.03(C).
183 See Annot., 21 A.LR.3d 116 (1967).
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were caused by inadvertent or reckless conduct were criminalized under
manslaughter statutes or not at all.184  However, many states faced with
the fact of jury nullification in the area have enacted special statutes reduc-
ing the grade of the offense and the possible punishment. 8" More recent
proposals on the subject have classified vehicular homicides caused by reck-
less behavior as manslaughter, while criminalizing grossly negligent vehic-
ular homicides under the broad category of negligent homidde.18 0 How-
ever, these proposals make it clear that if the negligent behavior is not a
gross deviation from an ordinary standard of care, then the conduct should
not be punished beyond the sanctions of the traffic offense and of any civil
liability. 1 7
Originally, in Ohio, an unintentional homicide that was proximately
caused by the violation of any traffic offense was classified as manslaughter
of the second degree.188 This extension of the unlawful act doctrine into
the vehicular homicide area at times was considered to produce harsh re-
suIts.' 8 9 Hence, in 1967, second degree manslaughter was reclassified and
regraded into first and second degree homicide by veldcle.19 0 Thus, under
the present Ohio law first degree homicide by vehicle includes an uninten-
tional homicide proximately caused by the violation of four specified traf-
fic offenses: (1) driving while intoxicated or drugged; 9' (2) reckless oper-
ation of a motor vehicle;0 2 (3) drag racing;193 and (4) reckless operation
of a motor vehicle off the streets.'0 Second degree vehicular homicide en-
compasses deaths proximately caused by violating any traffic regulation
other than the ones enumerated in the first degree section.'3
184 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1103 (1971).
185 See M.P.C. § 201.4, Comment at 53-54 (Tent. Draft No. 9). See aho Riesenfeld,
Negligent Homidde-A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 25 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1936); Afore-
land, supra note 137, at 825.
1
8 6 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.10 (McKinney 1967); M.P.C. § 210.4 (P.O.D.); PROP.
FED. CRIM. CODE § 1603.
187 M.P.C. § 201.4, Comment at 55 (Tent. Draft No. 9).
188 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.18 (Page 1965). The provision had alternative pen-
alties: (1) fine of not more than five-hundred dollars or imprisonment for not less than
thirty days or more than six months, or both; or (2) imprisonment in the penitentiary for not
less than one nor more than twenty years. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(a) (Page
1965).
18 9 See 47 IOWA L. REV. 168, 170 (1961).
190 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.18, .181 (Page Supp. 1970).
101 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page 1965).
192 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.20 (Page 1965).
193 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.25 (Page Supp. 1970).
'94 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.201 (Page Supp. 1970). The penalty for first degree
vehicular homicide is either a fine of not more than five-hundred dollars or imprisonment for
not less than 30 days nor more than six months, or both, or imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for one to 20 years. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(B) (Page Supp. 1970).
'
9 5 The penalty for second degree vehicular homicide is a fine of not more than five-
hundred dollars or imprisonment for not less than 30 days nor more than six months. OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (Page Supp. 1970).
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The amended proposed sections on vehicular homicides retain the basic
classification of the present Ohio law.'98 They are, though, somewhat more
expansive in their coverage of vehicular homicides because they include not
only homicides caused by automobiles but also homicides caused by water-
craft, aircraft, and locomotives. 97 The basic change that the proposed
vehicular homicide sections impose on the present law is that they base the
classification of the offenses solely on the culpable mental state of the de-
fendant rather than on the violation of any traffic regulation. Thus, ag-
gravated vehicular homicide requires a "reckless" mens rea while the vehic-
ular homicide offense only calls for negligence. With the requisite mental
state of "recklessly," aggravated vehicular homicide applies not only to
reckless homicides that otherwise would be classified as manslaughter but
also to homicide that would be classified under the present law as either
first or second degree homicide by vehicle. Depending upon the mental
state of the offender, the proposed offense could possibly be applied to
deaths caused by vehicle that are outside the scope of present criminal lia-
bility.'98 Similarly, the offense of vehicular homicide premised on a negli-
gence standard would be applicable to homicides caused by the negligent
operation of vehicles whether a safety regulation is violated or not.'"9 Even
1,PRop. OHIo C uM CODE § 2903.06 (as amended in SUB. -LB. 511) (aggravated ve-
hicular homicide):
(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor
vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall reddessly cause the death of an-
other.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide,
a felony of the fourth degree. If the offender has previously been convicted of
an offense under this section or section 2903.07 of the Revised Code, aggravated
vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree.
PRop. OMo CI&L CODE § 2903.07 (as amended in SUB. H.B. 511) (vehicular homicide:)
(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor
vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall negligently cause the death of
another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of vehicular homicide, a misde-
meanor of the first degree. If the offender has previously been convicted of an
offense under this section or section 2903.06 of the Revised Code, vehicular homi-
ide is a felony of the fourth degree.
Except for the addition of provisions aimed at recidivists, the sections are substantially un-
changed from the Techincal Committee's original proposal. See PROP. OHIO CRlM CODE
§§ 2903.04-.05.
197 Although there is no present statute in Ohio covering homicides caused by violations
of regulations concerning aircraft, there are statute dealing with homicides in connection
with watercraft and locomotives. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1547.13 (Page 1964) (water-
craft); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4999.04 (Page 1954) (locomotives). The proposed provi-
sions on vehicular homicide replace those statutes. See PROP. OHIO CRL CODE § 2903.05,
Committee Comments at 76.
298The possibility of construing the language of the amended definition of "reddessly"
to mean a subjective negligence standard should be kept in mind. However, the drafter's
comments to the original proposal on aggravated vehicular homicide suggest that "reck-
lessly" in this regard originally meant "heedless indifference to the consequences:' See PROP.
Osno CiNi. CODE § 2093.05, Committee Comments at 76.
I99The negligent mens rea requirement may possibly have only the one-sided effect
of including homicides that would nor be criminal under the present law rather than elimi-
nating the possibility of strict liability because violations of specific safety statutes in Ohio
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if the negligence standard for criminal liability is defined finally as ordi-
nary tort negligence instead of gross negligence, the application of the
proposed vehicular homicide statute would be at least parallel to the impo-
sition of civil liability. 00
The proposed sections of vehicular homicide wisely follow the general
system of gradation adopted by the Proposed Code. However, the propriety
of punishing vehicular homicides in separate provisions from the usual
categories of criminal liability is not without doubt. Pragmatically, though,
the factor of jury nullification in the area of vehicular homicides requires
special treatment. Putting to one side the problems with the definitions of
the two mental states which have been discussed previously, the proposed
sections will serve the function of the prevention of physical harm well.
David A. Gradwohl
APPENDIX I
A Legislative History in the Ohio House of Representatives
of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code Provisions on Capital
Murder and Murder
1. The following represent the original versions of the proposed capi-
tal murder and murder provisions that were introduced to the House in
HousE BILL No. 511:
CAPITAL MURDER
Sec. 2903.01. (A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation
and design, cause the death of another.
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another by means
of a firearm or dangerous ordnance carried in violation of section 2923.12
of the Revised Code.
(C) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another while com-
mitting or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or
arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or
escape.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of capital murder, and
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
MURDER
Sec. 2903.02. (A) No person shall knowingly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall be
punished as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
has been held to be negligence per se. Eiseahuth v. Moneyham, 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.
2d 440 (1954).
200 For a critical analysis of Ohio's present vehicular homicide law based upon the theory
that the Ohio law imposes criminal liability where there would be no civil sanction, see Note,
47 Iowa L. REv. 168 (1961).
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2. The following represent the versions of the proposed capital mur-
der and murder provisions that were designated as draft SuBsriTun:
HousE BILL No. 511:
CAPIrAL MURDER
Sec. 2903.01. (A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation
and design, cause the death of another.
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another whom he
knows is a law enforcement officer performing his duties in protecting
persons or property, preventing or detecting crime, apprehending or de-
taining offenders, or otherwise enforcing the law.
(C) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another while com-
mitting or attempting to commit or while fleeing immediately after com-
mitting or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or
arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or
escape.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of capital murder, and
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
MURDER
Sec. 2903.02. (A) No person shall knowingly cause the death of an-
other.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall be
punished as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code. If an of-
fense under this section takes place while the offender is under extreme
emotional stress for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse, mur-
der is a felony of the second degree. The reasonableness of such explana-
or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the of-
fender's situation at the time of the offense, under circumstances as he
believed them to be.
3. The following represent the versions of the proposed capital mur-
der and murder provisions that were passed by the Ohio House of Repre-
sentatives as SUBTITUTE HousE BILL No. 511:
CAP TAL MURDER
Sec. 2903.01. (A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calcula-
tion and -design, cause the death of another.
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another whom he
knows is a law enforcement officer performing his duties in protecting
persons or property, preventing or detecting crime, apprehending or de-
taining offenders, or otherwise enforcing the law.
(C) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another while com-
mitting or attempting to commit or while fleeing immediately after com-
mitting or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or
arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or
escape.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of capital murder, and
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
1972]
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MURDER
Sec. 2903.02. (A) No person shall knowingly cause the death of an.
other.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall be
punished as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
APPENDIX II
A Legislative History in the Ohio House of Representatives
of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code Provisions on Penalties
for Murder and the Imposition of Capital Punishment.
1. The following represent the original versions of the proposed pro-
visions for murder penalties that were introduced to the House in HousE
BILL No. 511:
PENALTIES FOR MURDER
Sec. 2929.01. (A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to capital
murder in violation of section 2903.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer
death, or be imprisoned for an indefinite term of twenty years to life, as
determined pursuant to sections 2929.02 and 2929.03 of the Revised Code.
(B) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation
of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code shall be imprisoned for an indef-
inite term of fifteen years to life.
IMPOSING SENTENCE FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE
Sec. 2929.02. (A) The jury or panel of three judges which tried the of-
fender shall determine the penalty to be imposed for a capital offense.
If an offender pleads guilty to a capital offense, the penalty shall be de-
termined by a panel of three judges or, when requested by the offender,
by a jury impaneled for the purpose.
(B) The penalty shall be separately determined following a verdict or
plea of guilty. The jury or panel of judges shall not consider the penalty
when determining the innocence or guilt of the accused, and the jury shall
be so instructed before retiring to consider its verdict,
(C) A verdict of guilty duly rendered by a properly constituted jury
or panel of judges, or a plea of guilty, is not avoided by the subsequent
disability of a juror or judge from participating in determining the penalty.
In such case, vacancies on the jury or panel of judges shall be filled in the
same manner as vacancies occurring during trial.
(D) Before the jury or panel of judges retires to consider the penalty
to be imposed for a capital offense, it shall hear such testimony or other
evidence as may be presented, the statement, if any, of the offender, and
the arguments, if any, of the counsel for the defense and prosecution,
relevant to the penalty which should be imposed on the offender. The
court then shall instruct the jury on its duties in determining the penalty.
(E) The jury or panel of judges shall give due consideration to the
criteria contained in section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, in determining
the penalty to be imposed on an offender for a capital offense.
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(F) The death penalty shall be imposed upon the concurrence therein
of all members of the jury or panel of judges, otherwise imprisonment
shall be imposed. When the death penalty is returned, the clerk of court
shall poll the jury or panel of judges to verify the concurrence therein of
each member.
(G) The court shall impose on the offender the penalty provided in
section 2929.01, determined pursuant to this section and section 2929.03
of the Revised Code.
CRITRIA FOR IMPOSING DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE
Sec. 2929.03. (A) In determining whether to impose death or imprison-
ment for a capital offense, the jury or panel of judges shall consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history, character, and
condition of the offender.
(B) The following shall be considered in favor of imposing the death
penalty for a capital offense:
(1) The offense endangered the security, or was intended to endanger
the security of this or any other state or the United States.
(2) The offense was the assassination, committed for racial, religious,
or political reasons, of a high public official, candidate for high public
office, or person of renown or veneration.
(3) The offense was committed for hire, or for purpose of gain.
(4) The offense was committed in order to escape detection, appre-
hension, trial, or punishment for another offense.
(5) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer engaged
in his duties at the time of the offense.
(6) The victim of the offense was a child under eighteen, an aged or
infirm person, or a person who was particularly unoffending or de-
fenseless.
(7) The victim of the offense was tortured or cruelly abused.
(8) The offender has willfully killed, or attempted to willfully kill
more than one person, including the victim of the offense at bar.
(C) The following shall be considered in favor of imposing imprison-
ment for a capital offense:
(1) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(2) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(3) There are circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though
failing to establish a defense.
(4) The offender acted under strong provocation.
(5) The offender has no history of prior assaultive offenses.
(6) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to rehabilitative
treatment.
2. The following represent the versions of the proposed provisions
on murder penalties that were designated as draft SUBSTITuTE Housu
BILL No. 511:
PENALTS FOR MURDER
Sec. 2929.01. (A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to capital
murder in violation of section 2903.01 of the Revised Code shall be im-
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prisoned for life, unless the jury or panel of judges trying the accused
recommends that no mercy be shown him, in which case he shall suffer
death.
(B) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation
of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code shall be imprisoned for an in.
definite term of fifteen years to life.
IMPOSING SENTENCE FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE
Sec. 2929.02. (A) The jury or panel of three judges which tries the
offender shall determine whether or not to recommend that no mercy be
shown him for a capital offense. If an offender pleads guilty to a capital
offense, whether or not to recommend that no mercy be shown shall be
determined by a panel of three judges or, when requested by the offender,
by a jury impaneled for the purpose.
(B) The jury or panel of judges shall give due consideration to the
criteria contained in section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, in determining
whether or not to recommend that no mercy be shown an offender for a
capital offense.
(C) A recommendation of no mercy shall be returned only upon the
concurrence therein of all members of the jury or panel of judges. If a
recommendation of no mercy is returned, the court shall impose sentence
of death upon the offender. Otherwise, the court shall impose sentence
of life imprisonment as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT FOIL A CAPITAL OFFENSE
Sec. 2929.03. (A) In determining whether or not to recommend that no
mercy be shown an offender for a capital offense, the jury or panel of
judges shall consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the
history, character, and condition of the offender.
(B) The following do not control the discretion of the jury or panel
of judges, but shall be considered in favor of recommending that no mercy
be shown an offender for a capital offense:
(1) The offense endangered the security, or was intended to endanger
the security of this or any other state or the United States.
(2) The offense was the assassination, committed for racial, religious,
or political reasons, of a high public official, candidate for high public
office, or person of renown or veneration.
(3) The offense was committed for hire, or for purpose of gain.
(4) The offense was committed in order to escape detection, appre-
hension, trial, or punishment for another offense.
(5) The victim of the offense was a law enforcerent officer engaged
in his duties at the time of the offense.
(6) The victim of the offense was a person who was particularly un-
offending or defenseless.
(7) The offender killed the victim from ambush.
(8) The victim of the offense was tortured or cruelly abused.
(9) The offender has willfully killed, or attempted to willfully kill
more than one person, including the victim of the offense at bar.
(C) The following do not control the discretion of the jury or panel
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of judges, but shall be considered in favor of showing mercy to an of-
fender for a capital offense:
(1) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(2) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(3) There are circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though
failing to establish a defense.
(4) The offender acted under strong provocation.
(5) The offender has no history of prior offenses of violence.
(6) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to rehabilitative
treatment.
(D) The criteria listed in Divisions (B) and (C) of this section shall
not be construed to limit the matters which may be considered in deter-
mining whether or not to recommend that no mercy be shown an offender
for a capital offense.
3. The following represent the versions of the proposed provisions
on murder penalties that were passed by the Ohio House of Representa-
fives as SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL No. 511:
PENALTIES FOR MURDER
Sec. 2929.01. (A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to capital
murder in violation of section 2903.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer
death, unless the jury or panel of judges trying the accused recommends
that mercy be shown him, in which case he shall be imprisoned for life.
In addition, the offender may be fined an amount fixed by the court, but
not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.
(B) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation
of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code shall be imprisoned for an indef-
inite term of fifteen years to life and, in addition, may be fined an amount
fixed by the court, but not more than fifteen thousand dollars.
(C) The court shall not impose a fine in addition to imprisonment or
death for capital murder, or in addition to imprisonment for murder, un-
less the offense was committed for hire or for purpose of gain.
(D) The court shall not impose a fine or fines for capital murder or
murder which, in the aggregate and to the extent not suspended by the
court, exceeds the amount which the offender is or will be able to pay by
the method and within the time allowed without undue hardship to him-
self or his dependents, or will prevent him from making reparation for the
victim's wrongful death.
(E) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to kidnapping for ran-
som in violation of Division (A) (1) of section 2905.01 of the Revised
Code shall suffer death, unless the jury or panel of judges trying the ac-
cused recommends that mercy be shown him, in which case he shall be
imprisoned for life. If the offender releases the victim in a safe place
unharmed, whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to kidnapping for ran-
som shall be imprisoned for an indefinite term of ten years to life.
IMPOSING SENTENCE FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE
Sec. 2929.02. (A) The jury or panel of three judges which tries the
offender shall determine whether or not to recommend that mercy be
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shown him for a capital offense. If an offender pleads guilty to a capital
offense, whether or not to recommend that mercy be shown shall be deter-
mined by a panel of three judges or, when requested by the offender, by a
jury impaneled for the purpose.
(B) The jury or panel of judges shall give due consideration to the
criteria contained in section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, in determining
whether or not to recommend that mercy be shown an offender for a cap-
ital offense.
(C) A recommendation of mercy shall be returned upon the concur-
rence therein of a majority of the members of the jury or panel of judges.
If a recommendation of mercy is returned, the court shall impose sentence
of life imprisonment upon the offender. Otherwise, the court shall impose
sentence of death, as provided in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT FOR A CAPITAL OFENSE
Sec. 2929.03. (A) In determining whether or not to recommend that
mercy be shown an offender for a capital offense, the jury or panel of
judges shall consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the
history, character, and condition of the offender.
(B) The following do not control the discretion of the jury or panel
of judges, but shall be considered against recommending that mercy be
shown an offender for a capital offense:
(1) The offense endangered the security, or was intended to endanger
the security of this or any other state or the United States;
(2) The offense was the assassination, committed for racial, religious,
or political reasons, of a high public official, candidate for high public
office, or person of renown or veneration;
(3) The offense was committed for hire, or for purpose of gain;
(4) The offense was committed in order to escape detection, appre-
hension, trial, or punishment for another offense;
(5) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer engaged
in his duties at the time of the offense;
(6) The victim of the offense was a person who was particularly un-
offending or defenseless;
(7) The offender killed the victim from ambush;
(8) The victim of the offense was tortured or cruelly abused;
(9) The offender has willfully killed, or attempted to willfully kill
more than one person, including the victim of the offense at bar.
(C) The following do not control the discretion of the jury or panel
of judges, but shall be considered in favor of showing mercy to an of-
fender for a capital offense:
(1) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
(2) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(3) There are circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though
failing to establish a defense;
(4) The offender acted under strong provocation;
(5) The offender has no history or prior offenses of violence;
(6) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to rehabilitative
treatment.
(D) The criteria listed in divisions (B) and (C) of this section shall
not be construed to limit the matters which may be considered in deter.
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mining whether or not to recommend that mercy be shown an offender for
a capital offense.
APPENDL IM
A Legislative History in the Ohio House of Representatives
of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code Provisions on Man-
slaughter, Negligent Homicide, and Vehicular Homicide.
1. The following represent the various stages in the development of
the manslaughter provisions in the Ohio House of Representatives:
a. The original versions in HousE BILL No. 511:
MANSLAUGHTER
Sec. 2903.03. (A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress
for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse, shall knowingly cause
the death of another. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the offender's sit-
uation at the time of the offense, under circumstances as he believed them
to be.
(B) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An of-
fense under section 2903.05 of the Revised Code does not constitute an
offense under this division.
(C) No person shall cause the death of another by committing any
offense of violence. An offense under section 2903.05 or 2903.06 of the
Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this division.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of manslaughter, a felony
of the third degree.
b. The version designated as draft SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL No. 511:
MANSLAUGHTER
Sec. 2903.04. (A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of an-
other. An offense under section 2903.06 of the Revised Code does not
constitute an offense under this division.
Sec. 2903.05. (B) No person shall cause the death of another by com-
mitting any offense. An offense under section 2903.06 or 2903.02 of the
Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this division.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of manslaughter, a felony
of the third degree.
c. The versions passed by the Ohio House as SUBSTITUTE HOUSE
BILL No. 511:
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Sec. 2903.03. I (A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress
brought on by serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into
using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another.
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(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaughter,
a felony of the first degree.
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Sec. 2903.04. (A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of an-
other. An offense under section 2903.06 of the Revised Code does not
constitute an offense under this section.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter, a felony of the third degree.
2. The following represent the various stages in the development of
the negligent homicide provision in the Ohio House of Representatives:
a. The original version in HOUSE BILL No. 511:
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
Sec. 2903.04. (A) No person shall negligently cause the death of an.
other by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in
section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
b. The version designated as draft SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL No. 511:
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
Sec. 2903.04. (A) No person shall negligently cause the death of an-
other by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in
section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
c. The version passed by the Ohio House as SUBSTITUTE HOUsE BILL
No. 511:
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
Sec. 2903.05. (A) No person shall negligently cause the death of an-
other by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in
section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.
(B) No person shall cause the death of another by committing any of-
fense. An offense under section 2903.06 or 2903.07 of the Revised Code
does not constitute an offense under this division.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
3. The following represent the various stages in the development of
the provisions on vehicular homicide in the Ohio House of Representa-
tives:
a. The original version in HoUsE BILL No. 511:
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AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HobucmE
Sec. 2903.05. (A) No person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft, shall recklessly cause
the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular
homicide, a felony of the fourth degree.
VEHICULR HOMCIDE
Sec. 2903.06. (A) No person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall
negligently cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of vehicular homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
b. The version designated as draft SuBSrruT Hous. BILL No.
511:
AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOmiCIDE
Sec. 2903.06. (A) No person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall reck-
lessly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular
homicide, a felony of the fourth degree. If the offender has previously
been convicted of an offense under this section or section 2903.06 of the
Revised Code, aggravated vehicular homicide is a felony of the third de-
gree.
VEHICULAR HoMIcmE
Sec. 2903.07. (A) No person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall neg-
ligently cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of vehicular homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree. If the offender has previously been con-
victed of an offense under this section or section 2903.05 of the Revised
Code, vehicular homicide is a felony of the fourth degree.
c. The version passed by the Ohio House as SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL
No. 511:
AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
Sec. 2903.06. (A) No person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft shall reck-
lessly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular
homicide, a felony of the fourth degree. If the offender has previously
been convicted of an offense under this section or section 2903.07 of the
Revised Code, aggravated vehicular homicide is a felony of the third de-
gree.
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VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
Sec. 2903.07. (A) No person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall neg-
ligently cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of vehicular homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree. If the offender has previously been con-
victed of an offense under this section or section 2903.06 of the Revised
Code, vehicular homicide is a felony of the fourth degree.
